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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of bureaucratic corruption on scal policy out-
comes for economies that have constituted to a greater or lessen extent independent
central banks. The adverse implications of corruption on debt accumulation are
veried using a cross-sectional setting of 77 developed and developing countries.
Approximating central bank independence as that point in time that a major cen-
tral bank reform took eect, we nd that more corruption leads to higher debt
accumulation. More importantly, complementing the analysis with a measure for
the level of independence each reform gave strengthens the results; the impact of
corruption is greater, the higher the independence that was granted. The ndings
are robust to dierent subsets of the sample and dierent sets of control variables.
Suboptimal institutional quality poses diculties on the achievement of a bal-
anced debt process, which could obstacle price stability, despite the constitution
of independent central banks.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to explore empirically the impact of bureaucratic corruption
on scal policy outcomes of countries with independent central banks. More precisely,
our empirical analysis concentrates on the relationship between debt accumulation and
corruption after full or partial central bank independence has been legislated.
There has been a general and intensively increasing trend towards Central Bank
Independence (CBI) in the past couple of decades among both industrial and devel-
oping countries. During late 1980s and early 1990s many industrial countries have
strengthened or established the independent legal status of their central banks, and
developing countries followed their example soon afterwards. In the same context,
many countries have opted for an ination targeting framework, assigning ination as
the nominal anchor of the economy and announcing explicit quantitative ination tar-
gets which can be easily veried ex post. However, the macroeconomic performances
of the economies in question have been diverse, with special emphasis on the discrep-
ancies among developed and developing countries.
There is widespread consensus on central bank independence being that monetary
institutional design that eliminates the time-inconsistency problem and its subsequent
inationary bias (Barro and Gordon 1983). With the recognition that the ination
bias is, at least partially, determined by the taxation policy and hence the nancing
structure of government spending (Alesina and Tabellini 1987), the literature has also
focused on the interactions among monetary and scal policy, by endogenising the
latter. Huang and Wei (2006) is one of the rst papers that allows for the quality of
institutions to be examined.
Dimakou (2006) re-addresses the eectiveness of central bank independence in a
dynamic framework in which bureaucratic corruption shapes and constrains scal de-
cisions, which in turn aect monetary policymaking. She concludes that corruption
intensity can undermine price stability through the strategic use of debt accumulation.1
Even if an independent central bank is constituted, the government has the incentive
to indirectly `force' an expansionary monetary policy by increasing debt accumulation.
The current work attempts to explore these ndings empirically, by concentrating on
the response of debt policies after the introduction of independent central banks in
countries faced with dierent levels of bureaucratic corruption.
Our paper is related with two strands of the literature; central bank independence
and corruption. The empirical literature on CBI is vast and mainly concentrates on
the eect of independence on macroeconomic performance, namely ination. Due to
the lack of CBI evolution data, the approaches are mainly cross-sectional, and the
results are mixed.2 Furthermore, there appears to be no empirical work linking central
bank independence and scal policy.3 On the other hand, the corruption literature fo-
1This incentive is prominent, unless a less conservative CB, regarding output considerations, is
delegated and unless the economy is faced with severe levels of corruption.
2For a survey of the empirical literature on CBI see for instance Eijnger and de Haan (1996) and
Berger, Haan, and Eijnger (2001). Recent empirical studies include both time series and panel data
analyses.
3Masciandaro and Tabellini (1987) study the relationship between central bank independence and
decits. Neyapti (2003) examines the impact of budget decits on ination for dierent levels of central
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cuses on the impact of corruption on economic growth, mainly through the investment
transmission channel, and ignores other links with macroeconomic scal or monetary
performance.4
We attempt to bring those two literatures together and assess the eect of corrup-
tion and independence on scal policy, and more precisely on total public debt. In a
cross-sectional setting, CBI is approximated as a point in time, that is, as that central
bank reform that gave a decisive step towards central bank autonomy. The impact of
corruption is veried by comparing the level of debt before and after the reform date
for a set of 77 countries. Reforms span during the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, in-
cluding a set of developing countries that have not been assessed before. Our approach
bears more resemblance with event studies, which have been quite limited, but recently
growing, in the central bank independence literature. In addition, we complement our
analysis with a newly compiled Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) index for the
level of independence each reform gave.
Our main results verify the importance of bureaucratic corruption in explaining
debt accumulation given the introduction of central bank independence. The eect
of corruption after an important central bank reform on debt-to-GPD ratio and on
an approximate measure of decit (rst dierence of debt-to-GDP) is signicant, al-
though quantitatively small. Nonetheless, the impact of dierent levels of corruption
on debt-to-GDP growth is both signicant and sizeable. Hence, we do nd that more
corruption leads to more debt accumulation. More importantly, we show that the
eect of corruption is stronger, the higher the degree of independence the respective
central bank was granted after the reform. The empirical results are robust to dierent
specications, control variables and sub-samples.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses briey central
bank independence, both in terms of the way it has been measured and in terms of its
evolution within and across geo-economic groups, motivating the empirical approach
to be used here. In sections 3 we present the data and the methodology. Section 4
depicts estimation results, and Section 5 concludes.
bank independence and nancial development.
4Rose-Ackerman (1999), Aron (2000) and Aidt (2003) provide thorough surveys of the empirical
literature on corruption
3
2 Central Bank Reforms and Central Bank Independence
Institutional reforms are promoted aiming at adjusting the incentives of the economic
actors involved and improving economic outcomes. As regards to monetary institu-
tions, it is widely accepted that delegation of monetary policy to an ination-averse
and independent central bank is that institutional design that overcomes the time-
inconsistency problem, by `tying' the hands of the government and eliminating the
inationary bias (Rogo 1985, Walsh 1995, Svensson 1997).
A substantial empirical literature has concentrated at exploring the impact of cen-
tral bank independence on macroeconomic performance, namely ination. Conven-
tionally, the independent status of a central bank has been measured as the degree of
legal autonomy identied in the central bank act based on a set of common legal crite-
ria, which are then scored and weighted accordingly. A list of the most widely known
and frequently used CBI indexes is presented in Table 1.5 Following the seminal works
of Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991)6 on 18 OECD countries and Cukierman,
Webb, and Neyapti (1992)7 on 72 countries, a vast empirical literature has ourished
attempting to identify the eect of CBI on macroeconomic performance, testing the
hypothesis that central bank independence promotes ination stability.8
Table 1: Central Bank Independence Indexes
AL Alesina (1988, 1989)
BP Bade - Parkin (1988)
ES Eijnger - Schaling (1993)
GMT GMT (1991)
LVAU Un-weighted Legal Index of Cukierman (1992)
LVAW Weighted Legal Index of CWN (1992)
SUMLV CWN (1992) sum of 16 legal variables
TOR Turnover rate Cukierman (1992) & CWN (1992)
VUL Political Vulnerability Index Cukierman - Webb (1995)
NOR Non-political turnover rate Cukierman - Webb (1995)
Results are mixed. The main ndings suggest that independence does indeed re-
late to lower ination in advanced economies, but for developing countries the negative
relation is not robust to the time-period covered, the country samples and a set of con-
trol variables. Earlier empirical studies are mainly cross-sectional due to the lack of
time-variation in independence and its measurement. As Cukierman (2006) ascertains,
during the 40 years ending in 1989 there hardly had been reforms in central bank leg-
islation, based on a number of legal indexes.
However, during the 1990s and beginning of 2000s the legal independence of most
central banks has been updated. There has been a general trend -among both advanced
and developing countries- towards enhanced CBI and numerous aspects of central bank
legislations have been revised. Given this ongoing process, many dierent studies
attempted to assess central bank independence developing dierent indexes or updating
5The last three indexes measure actual independence.
6Thereafter cited as GMT (1991)
7Thereafter cited as CWN (1992)
8For a survey of CBI indexes, comparisons and criticism, and empirical evidence see Arnone, Lau-
rens, and Segalotto (2006), Berger, Haan, and Eijnger (2001), Eijnger and de Haan (1996).
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the already existing ones for selected county groups (see Table 2).
Table 2: Updated CBI-Indexes
Cukierman, Miller, 26 Former
and Neyapti (2002) Update CWN Socialistic Economies
20 Former
Maliszewski (2000) Update and Extend GMT Socialistic Economies
15 Former Soviet
Lybek (1999) Own Index Union countries as of 1997
Jacome and Update GMT, CWN & 24 Latin American
Vazquez (2005) Modied Cukierman Index & Caribbean countries
Castens and 15 Latin American
Jacome (2005) Modied Index countries as of 2003
Arnone, Laurens and
Segalotto (2006) Update GMT 40 countries as of 2003
Mehran 20 Sub-Saharan African
et al (1998) Own Index countries as of 1996
Sturm & Update TOR 90 countries for
de Haan (2001) 1980s and 1990s
Ahsan et al (2006b) Own Index 36 East Asian and Pacic
countries
Gisolo (2007) Own index 12 Mediterranean coun-
tries as of 2006
The updated CBI-indexes do verify the signicance of this institutional design in
the policy agenda of many countries and the move towards more independent monetary
policymaking. At the same time, they raise compatibility issues both across countries
and across time.
The timing of an institutional reform has been a widely neglected piece of informa-
tion on how a commitment by the policymakers to a more independent central bank
-materialised in the form of a legislation- can aect macroeconomic performance. This
is the approach we follow. In our empirical investigation, central bank independence
is primarily identied as that point in time that an important central bank reform
took place providing a decisive step towards independence and observe the evolution
of selected macroeconomic policies from that point onwards compared to before.
Event studies in this area of economic literature have been limited, although re-
cently growing, concentrating mainly on time-series approaches and on ination target-
ing adoption dates. Daunfeldt and de Luna (2003) investigate the eect of implementa-
tion dates of central bank reforms on the price stability process in 23 OECD countries.
Using a non-parametric time-series method they rst extract cyclical trends (medium
run component) and irregular shocks (short run component) from the ination series
of each country, and then they compare the long run component of ination with the
reform dates in a descriptive manner.9 Diana, Papadopoulos, and Sidiropoulos (2005)
examine ination dynamics in 7 transition economies, by applying an exogenous break
point methodology on the ination series to test the signicance of the reform date.
Clifton, Leon, and Wong (2001) examine the eect of ination targeting (IT) on the
unemployment-ination trade-o for 7 OECD targeters 9 non-targeters in a time-series
9They extend their analysis to include more countries in Daunfeldt and de Luna (2008).
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setting. Time is transformed with T being the quarter of IT adoption for each tar-
geting country and then spans symmetrically in the interval of (T   24; T + 24). Ball
and Sheridan (2003) compare the eect of ination targeting in 20 OECD countries (7
targeters and 13 non-targeters) in a cross-sectional dierence-in-dierence approach.
Most recently, Acemoglu, Johnson, Querubin, and Robinson (2008) use a panel data
approach, with a 0-1 time dummy variable for the date of central bank reform for a set
of 52 countries, attempting to assess the impact of political institutions on ination,
given the central bank reform. Daunfeldt, Granlund, Landstrom, and Rudholm (2010)
study the eect of CBI reforms on ination rates covering the event (or not) of central
bank reforms in 132 countries during the period 1980-2005. They use a random eect
panel model and examine the interaction between the level of democracy and political
stability. Again, the reform is modeled in a 0-1 fashion. In general, event studies have
mixed results, with many not nding evidence in support of the importance of the
central bank reform or ination targeting date.
The approach here bears some similarities with the aforementioned studies. As in
Clifton, Leon, and Wong (2001), time is transformed such that  refers to the central
bank Act reform date or the ination targeting adoption for each country. As in Ball
and Sheridan (2003), we perform a cross-sectional analysis, but do not use dierence-
in-dierence estimation. The size and diversity of our country sample does not allow
to test for dierences between non-reform and reform countries. Furthermore, due to
the use of such a large number of countries, the reform dates span from 1989 to 2002,
and it would be very dicult to nd a control group (of non-reform cases), as well as
a reference date for the comparison.
The timing of a reform is undoubtedly a objective measure of a monetary policy
shift, but the magnitude of the reform will inevitably dier from one country to an-
other. Our empirical analysis is complemented with the level of independence each
reform gave, using a newly compiled GMT-index. Before turning to our empirical
investigation, we briey present the evolution of central bank independence during
the 1990s and beginning of 2000s for our country sample, organised by geo-economic
group.
Advanced Economies
The high volume of central bank reforms during 1990s within the advanced economies
is mainly attributed to the Euro Area members. In accordance with the Maastricht
Treaty provisions for the European Monetary Union (EMU), EU-members that opted
for EMU-participation have gradually reorganised their central bank laws until the
last stage of currency unication in 1999. In many cases, an intermediate reform took
place around 1994, consistent with the guidelines of legislation harmolisation by the
European Monetary Institute. Not only EMU-participants beneted from these re-
forms. Denmark,10 UK and Sweden, also reformed their CB legislations on the same
lines. As regards to other non-EU advanced economies, changes in CB legislations and
in the degree of CBI were much less frequent and of smaller magnitude.
10The case of Denmark is somewhat ambiguous; According to the CB ocial webcite and Lybek
and Morris (2004) Denmark did not have a reform since 1969. This is also conrmed by However,
Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto (2006) report a 1998 amendment according to which the degree of
CBI in Denmark improved substantially since the original GMT assessment of 1991.
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Table 3: CBI (GMT-index) Evolution: Advanced Economies
GMT (1991) ALS (2003) Updated*
PA EA TA PA EA TA TA
Total Average 2.88 4.722 7.611 5.944 6.444 12.39 12.29
Euro-10 Average 3 4 7 8 5.9 13.9 13.91
Non-Euro Average 2.75 5.625 8.375 3.375 7.125 10.5 10.66
Sources: Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991), Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto (2006)
and own-calculations
The Euro Area includes: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Nether-
lands, Portugal and Spain; and the Non-Euro Area: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan,
New Zealand, Switzerland, UK, and USA.
*Includes Finland and Luxembourg for the Euro-Average and Iceland, Malta (2002), Norway
and Sweden (1999) for the Non-Euro Average.
Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto (2006) follow the evolution of central bank inde-
pendence for the same 18 OECD countries that GMT (1991) studied and conrm that
the magnitude of recent reforms among the non-Euro advanced economies is small.
USA11 retains the same degree of independence, though Australia and Japan show
marginal increases. Only in Switzerland and New Zealand marked increases in their
CBI are observed, although in the case of New Zealand the initial GMT (1991) assess-
ment did not include the 1989 reform.
Table 3 presents a comparison of the GMT-index between 1991 and 2003, as as-
sessed by Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) and Arnone, Laurens, and Sega-
lotto (2006). Overall, the high level of autonomy is mainly driven by the Euro Area
economies and the increases are mainly attributable to political autonomy improve-
ments. In 1991 the average level of CBI for the Advanced Economies was 7.611, with
the non-Euro economies being above the average and the Euro economies below. The
reverse is true for 2003. On average independence increased by around 60%, and for
the Euro area is has almost doubled. In the spectrum of political autonomy, the Euro
Area has attained the maximum score, and averages much higher than the non-Euro
economies. Regarding economic autonomy, the non-euro area averages higher. This is
so merely because Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto (2006) penalises the Euro group for
having the European Central Bank, rather than the national one, setting the discount
rate.
There are no updated GMT-indexes for Luxembourg, Finland, Iceland, Malta,
Norway and Sweden. Since, these are countries included in our empirical analysis, we
construct the GMT-index using the Acts amended under the relevant central bank
reform and integrate the results in the last column of Table 3. For more details
regarding the GMT-assessment of these countries see Appendix A.2.
Europe and Central Asia (ECA):
Within the process of transition from a planned to a market economy, central bank-
ing reforms were part of broader structural changes in the ECA region. During the
1990s, all former socialist economies (FSU) created new central bank laws and Central
and East European (CEE) countries reformed pre-existing Charters. Despite cross-
section variation, the reforms in central bank legislation were inuenced by western
11USA had no central bank reform and thus not included in our sample.
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institutional arrangements (e.g. Budensbank) and granted a high level of central bank
independence.
A second wave of reforms -from the second half of 1990s and onwards- was moti-
vated by EU participation and future EMU aspiration. These include: Czech, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania as well as
Turkey.12 Together with the CB reforms, the majority of the countries moved away
from the xed pegs to either more exible exchange rate regimes, e.g. managed oats,
as in Czech Republic (1997), Slovak Republic (1998), and Poland (1998) or to hard
pegs, as Lithuania and Estonia did. The rest of the countries in our sample, Albania,
Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova and Russia, which apart from the rst were all
FSU economies, also underwent major central bank reforms.
The transition economies have received considerable attention for updating central
bank independence measurements. Overall, during the past couple of decades there
have been intensive reforms which improved substantially the degree of independence,
as observed by the Cukierman-index for 26 Former Socialist Economics in Cukierman,
Miller, and Neyapti (2002) and by a specic index in Lybek (1999) for 15. Maliszewski
(2000) develops an Extended-GMT-index for the transition economies and compares
his ndings with the above mentioned studies. Figure 1 presents the GMT-index for
the ECA countries included in our empirical analysis, using the data of Maliszewski
(2000) and, when missing, complementing them with our calculations.13
Figure 1: CBI Evolution in ECA
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It becomes obvious that the reforms in this area were very ambitious giving a
decisive step towards the legal autonomy of monetary policy. Note that Figure 1 shows
CBI evolution comparing two reforms during the 1990s. If further we consider that
before the rst reform (and especially for the FSU countries) central bank independence
was very close to zero, then the gravity of the reforms is even stronger. Overall, the
average for the group increased from 9.45 for the rst set of reforms in the beginning of
1990s to 11.23 for the most recent ones. One interesting aspect of this region's reforms
is that in most cases political autonomy has being higher than economic autonomy,
12Turkey and Cyprus are not transition economies, but are classied as ECA from a geographical
perspective. Estonia and Lithuania have adopted currency board arrangements, which leave no scope
for monetary policy, hence they are excluded from our empirical study.
13Czech Republic (1998), Latvia (1998), Slovak (2001), Slovenia (2002), as well as Cyprus (2002)
and Turkey (2001) are reforms in which we update the GMT-index.
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especially with respect to the rst reform. This observation is not a very common
one since it is more costly and more dicult to legally isolate the central bank from
political inuences, rather than allow for economic autonomy. More information about
central bank independence in the region is provided in Appendix A.3.
Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC):
During the 1990s central bank reforms became an important component of the eco-
nomic agenda in most Latin American countries. Many of these countries experienced
incidents of hyperination and economic recessions during 1980s, which were partly
attributable to the use of monetary policy for short-term political purposes, either
nancing expansionary scal policies or stimulating economic activity.
In an attempt to bring ination down and restore the credibility of monetary pol-
icy, policymakers implemented institutional changes by reforming the central bank's
legislation, and in many cases, the constitution, with explicit provision for the cen-
tral bank, its functions and its degree of autonomy.14 Following the nancial crises of
1990s many Latin American countries opted for more exible exchange rate regimes,
and some shifted monetary policy towards ination targeting. Another motivation for
the shift of attention towards legal CBI in Latin America suggested by Maxeld (1997)
refers to governments' drive to compete for international creditworthiness. In contrast
to Latin America, changes to CB legislations were largely absent in the Caribbean.
There is no single comprehensive study that covers all the reforms that took place
in the region, hence CBI data will be based on dierent sources and own calculations.
Jacome (2001), Jacome and Vazquez (2005), Carstens and Jacome (2005) follow the
evolution of central bank independence in LAC during the 1990s and its eect on
macroeconomic performance. Their data are complemented by the most recent up-
dates of Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto (2006) for Brasil (1999), El Salvador (1996)
and Peru (2002) and by Lybek and Morris (2004) for some Caribbean countries. Fi-
nally, for Chile (1999), Mexico (1999), Nicaragua (1999), and Venezuela (2001) we
calculate the GMT-index.
Figure 2 uses all available data on the GMT-index to graphically illustrate the
increases in central bank independence from the reforms that took place in the region
during 1990s.
Despite the methodological and comparability issues that arise from combining
many dierent studies, central bank reforms did take place in the region and the
average independence level as measured by the GMT-index increased from around 7.7
to 11.2 after the reforms of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s. There was much more
movement in the Latin America compared to the Caribbean, in terms of both frequency
and size of reforms. Overall, economic autonomy is higher, and there is still space for
improvements in terms of political autonomy. Apart from legally strengthening the
autonomy status of their central banks many Latin American countries shifted towards
fully-edged ination targeting regimes; Chile (1999), Colombia (2000), Brazil (2000)
and Peru (2002). For more information about central bank independence in LAC see
Appendix A.4.
14Gutierrez (2003) concentrates on the constitutional provisions for CBI to construct an index based
on this information and assesses its importance in lowering ination in LAC.
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Figure 2: CBI Evolution in LAC
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East Asia and the Pacic (EAP):
The average level of central bank independence in East Asia and the Pacic (EAP)
has been relatively low (Maxeld 1997), however, in the wake of the 1997 Asian eco-
nomic crisis the issue of CBI gained in importance. The nancial crisis raised the need
for a redetermination of the institutional frameworks of monetary and exchange rate
policies. This generally triggered more exible exchange rate regimes and more in-
dependent and transparent central banking. Among the crisis-hit countries, Malaysia
xed its currency to the USD in 1998, though Indonesia (1999), Korea (1998), Philip-
pines (2002) and Thailand (2000) ocially proclaimed to oat their exchange rate
while adopting an ination-targeting monetary policy framework, implicitly or explic-
itly. Most of the Asian countries proceeded to central bank reforms soon after the
crisis (except for Malaysia, China and Philippines).
The literature on measuring and assessing the impact of central bank independence
in East Asia and the Pacic has been limited.15 A recent paper by Ahsan, Skully,
and Wickramanayake (2006b) develops a Central Bank Independence and Governance
(CBIG) index for 36 Asian Pacic countries, providing valuable information about the
level and evolution of independence in the region, but not allowing for comparisons
with other regions. We, therefore, construct the GMT-index for the EAP countries to
be included in our empirical work, namely for China (1995), Indonesia (1999), South
Korea (1998), Malaysia (1994), Philippines (1993), Singapore (1998) and Thailand
(2000).Overall, economic autonomy is higher than political, and the average score of the
region is 7.7. Political autonomy is limited in EAP, especially in terms of the ap-
pointment structure, the terms in oce and conict resolutions. Moreover, apart from
Indonesia and Korea, in all other cases government representatives are allowed in the
Board. Economic autonomy scores better. In the aftermath of the crisis, the regu-
latory and supervisory structure of the banking systems has improved in the region
and the importance of nancial stability is also veried within the Bank's objectives.
For more details on central bank independence in EAP region and a comparison of
our GMT-index ndings with the CBIG-index of Ahsan, Skully, and Wickramanayake
(2006b) refer to Appendix A.5.
15Fry (1996) is an exception. Also JP-Morgan (2000) analyses central banking for selected countries
in the EAP region.
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Figure 3: CBI in EAP
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Subsaharan Africa (SSA)
SSA consists of a set of fairly new central banks, established after the grant of inde-
pendence in the 1960s, and coinciding with the introduction of national currencies.
Colonial independence led to a number of dierent institutional arrangements and
post-colonial Africa exhibits one of the richest landscapes of monetary policy and ex-
change regimes. Two broad patterns can be identied depending on the sphere of
inuence, the British and the Franc zones (Honohan and O'Connell 1997, Masson and
Pattillo 2005).16
The use of monetary policy for economic development and scal decit nancing,
the underdeveloped debt and nancial markets, the high external, and recently do-
mestic, debt burdens, and a series of aid ows generate a dierent set of challenges
for SSA central banks since they do not always hold the necessary monetary policy
instruments to aect the market. In that sense, and despite some countries recent at-
tempts to modernise their monetary policy frameworks and strengthen the autonomy
of central banks, SSA countries face a set of dierent structural and political prob-
lems, in which legal provisions may only poorly capture real practice. The Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative reects the extent of these challenges for
some countries. Further, Christensen (2005) points caution to the reliance on domestic
debt, especially among non-HIPC.
Mehran, Ugolini, Briaut, Iden, Lybek, Swaray, and Hayward (1998) provide a
thorough study of the nancial sector development for 32 SSA countries and they also
construct their own CBI-index for 20 of these. However, this index does not allow
for comparisons with the rest of the country groups, and does not refer to the most
updated central bank Acts, since at the time of the study many laws were under re-
view. For that reason and based on data availability, we construct the GMT-index for
9 SSA-countries included in our regression analysis.17
On average, the level of central bank independence in the region, calculated at
6.88, is limited, both in terms of political and economic autonomy. For the former,
the lowest scores come from the provisions regarding the appointment procedure and
16Since the CFA Franc zone does not leave much space for independent monetary policymaking, we
will not concentrate on the African countries of the corresponding currency unions.
17We did not manage to nd English translations of the CB Acts for Ethiopia (1994) and Burundi
(1993), countries also included in our regressions. We use information from Mehran et al (1998) to
extract the GMT scores.
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term in oce of the Governor and Board. On the economic autonomy side, central
laws lack in terms of a formal prohibition of direct credit to the government and direct
participation in the primary debt market, activities that have been prohibited among
the IND, ECA and LAC groups.
Figure 4: CBI in SSA
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Source: Author's calculations.
Another common aspect in the region refers to banking system supervision. Su-
pervision was a late arrival, since the banking system has been dominated by foreign
banks and subsequently by government owned ones. Recent changes with the emer-
gence of new banks and the increase in competition have lead to notable progress
in modernising the banking laws and putting the basis for supervision. Nonetheless,
in almost all SSA countries, banking supervision is vested within the central bank's
functions. Overall, economic autonomy is higher compared to political autonomy, ex-
cept for South Africa. Kenya (KEN-1997), Rwanda (RWA-1997) and Sierra Leone
(SLE-2000) rank on the top, with scores almost equally distributed between the two
aspects of independence. South Africa moved to an ination targeting framework in
2000. Appendix A.6 provides more information and an analytical assessment of the
CMT-index for the region.
Middle-East & North Africa (MENA):
The push for central bank independence in the MENA region has been limited com-
pared to other regions. Starting in about 1985, Arab governments shifted at varying
rates toward policies aiming at achieving macroeconomic stability, a higher degree of
integration with the world economy and an expanded role for the private sector. Dur-
ing the 1990s most countries have also made cautious progress with structural reforms,
including trade liberalisation and privatisation (Page 2003).
In the rst half of the 1990s, partial central bank reforms took place in Alge-
ria (1991)18, Egypt (1992), Qatar (1993), Jordan (1992), Morocco (1993) and Tunisia
(1994). For more details about some of those early reforms see Maxeld (1997). Central
bank independence in the region has been largely ignored both in policy and academic
cycles. Hence, assessment of the level of independence in the Middle East and North
Africa has been very limited. Based merely on data availability 7 MENA countries are
included in our empirical analysis. A GMT-index is available from Arnone, Laurens,
and Segalotto (2006) for four of them, and an own assessment has been performed for
the last three. A recent paper by Gisolo (2007) constructs a specic measure for 12
18Due to data unavailability, Algeria is not included in our empirical study.
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Mediterranean central banks, including some from the MENA region.
Figure 5: CBI in MENA
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Source: Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto (2006) and author's calculations.
As depicted in Figure 5, central bank independence in the region is very low, scoring
around 6.28. Overall, monetary policy in the region is either subject to requirements
of maintaining a pegged or highly managed exchange rate, and /or focused on credit
and its allocation across sectors. To date, many MENA countries, such as Jordan, Mo-
rocco, and Tunisia, have strengthened banking supervision and regulation, and have
taken steps to conform to international Basel standards. Despite the on-going process
towards more market-based structures, the banking and nancial sectors remain un-
derdeveloped, relative to other regions with similar economic development. The region
is also characterised by inecient debt markets.
Countries that seem to be deviating from this norm are Israel, Tunisia and Morocco.
It is suggested by many that actual independence is higher than legal in Israel.19 The
only major amendment to the status of the central bank was made in 1985 with the
passing of the \No Printing Law", which prohibited the Bank from granting loans
to the government. Israel moved in ination targeting in June 1997. Both Gisolo
(2007) and Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto (2006) ascertain that Tunisia enjoys the
higher level of independence in the MENA region. Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto's
(2006) GMT-index shows that although economic autonomy is high, Bank Al-Maghrib
is politically dominated. Both Tunissia and Morroco have been preparing towards
ination targeting. More details regarding the level of CBI in the region are provided
in Appendix A.7.
Summary
Institutional changes within the monetary policy framework did take place during
the 1990s and the majority of them improved the degree of independence and mod-
ernised central banking activities. Overall, the Advanced economies region attains the
highest level of central bank independence, followed closely by ECA and LAC. Those
two groups rank higher than the non-Euro Advanced economies. Contrary to conven-
tional wisdom, this veries that high legal CBI is not only a concern of the advanced
economies. It should also be noted that actual independence could be dierent. The
last three geo-economic groups have substantially lower levels of independence, though
19See Gisolo (2007).
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that should be viewed in the overall economic-political history and environment of
those regions that dier from the others. EAP ranks rst, followed by SSA and nally
by MENA.
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3 Data and Methodology
Our empirical analysis concentrates on the impact of corruption on scal policies given
that full or partial central bank independence has been legislated. Dimakou (2006) de-
velops a two period model in which monetary and scal policies interact under dierent
levels of bureaucratic corruption. The main ndings suggest that, in the presence of
corruption, central bank independence might not be the optimal institutional design.
Even if an independent central bank is constituted, the government has the incentive
to strategically accumulate debt in an attempt to indirectly `force' the central bank
to pursue an expansionary monetary policy. The channel of transmission lies on the
central bank's output considerations. Consequently, economies faced with higher bu-
reaucratic corruption that set independent central banks should observe rising levels
of debt and higher levels of ination vis a vis others with higher institutional quality.
This result provides an explanation for the poorer ination performance of especially
developing and emerging economies that moved towards central bank autonomy.
The testable hypothesis to be analysed here is whether central bank independence
`ties' the hands of the government, by looking at the debt responses of economies that
moved towards a more independent monetary institutional design.
3.1 Method
The methodology adopted bears similarities with the cross-sectional growth models
where initial GDP levels are used to examine the existence of \-convergence", as
for example in Barro (1991). The empirical investigation of our argument involves
estimating the eect of bureaucratic corruption on debt after an important central
bank reform in a cross-sectional setting. This is conducted as follows. Suppose a
country had a decisive CB reform at some point in time, say  . We then calculate
the average debt-to-GDP of 3 years before the reform (including the year ) and the
average debt-to-GDP level corresponding to 3 years after the reform. Hence, for each
country we have,
DB =
d 2 + d 1 + d
3
DA =
d+1 + d+2 + d+3
3
where dt = Dt=GDPt corresponds to the debt-to-GDP ratio and DB and DA corre-
spond to averages of 3 years before and after respectively.
The starting point of the empirical analysis of the regime shift is captured by model
(1).
DAi = + QUALi + Xi + DBi + i (1)
Despite being a snapshot analysis, there is a time-dimensional element generated by
DBi and essentially by the timing of the reform. This specication allows for an
implicit long-run eect of corruption and control variables on debt, given that  < 1.
Driven by the empirical results, discussed in section 4, we also investigate the
following specication, in which we impose the restriction that the coecient of the
3-years before the reform average debt-to-GDP ratio is unity ( = 1). Hence, we do
not allow for the existence of long-run eects.
DDi = + QUALi + Xi + ui (2)
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where DDi = DAi  DBi and can be viewed as a gross measure of decit as a share
of GDP.20
Our last specication investigates the impact of corruption in the growth rate of
debt, after the monetary policy regime shift takes place. This specication scales for the
`initial' (3-year average before the reform) debt-to-GDP level, and hence acknowledges
the impact of DBi on all variables, including the variance of the error term.
GDi = + QUALi + Xi + "i (3)
where GD is the percentage change in the average 3 years before and after debt-to-
GDP ratio, calculated as GD = DA DBDB  100:
QUAL reects the level of corruption (quality) of each country and X consists of a
set of control variables. Subscript i refers to each observation (country and reform) in
our sample, thus countries with two central bank reforms are treated as dierent ob-
servations. The choice of 3 years averaging was merely driven by debt data availability.
Although not presented here, using 4 and 5 years averages does not qualitatively aect
our results, but increases the cases with missing data.21
3.2 Data
Our country sample consists of 77 countries, 23 advanced and 54 developing. Central
bank reform dates span from 1989 to 2002. 29 countries had two reforms during
the examined period which raises the number of observations in the model to i = 106.
Developing countries come from all geo-economic regions and provide for a very diverge
sample, as analysed in the previous section. Countries are classied into geo-economic
and income groups according to Jaimovich and Panizza (2006). Appendix B presents
the country sample and the reform dates.
Debt
Collecting public debt data for a big set of countries over a balanced time period is
a cumbersome task. Most available debt data sets are incomplete (e.g. International
Financial Statistics (IFS), World Bank Indicators), both in terms of cross-sectional and
time series coverage. A more extensive data set on external debt is available. However,
as we are interested in total, domestic and external, public debt and the evolution of
external debt might not be a good indicator for overall debt we cannot use this data
set. To our knowledge, the most complete publicly available data set, which we use
in this study, is provided by Jaimovich and Panizza (2006) (hereafter JP). Their debt
data set refers to central government debt (both external and domestic) as a share of
GDP. A separate GDP column is available, measured in current billion USD. JP data
refer to gross central government debt. For more information regarding JP data and
their methodology see Jaimovich and Panizza (2006).
20Following Campos, Jaimovich, and Panizza (2006), we also estimate a dierent decit specication,
in which GDP changes are isolated. The results remain the same as in (2).
21Even with 3 years averages, we have missing debt data for the pre-reform period for Albania
(1996), Chile (1989), Czech (1993), Georgia (1996), Hungary (1991), Kenya (1997), Latvia (1992),
Moldova (1995), Poland (1992), Slovak Republic (1993) and Slovenia (1991).
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Bureaucratic Corruption
As a proxy for bureaucratic corruption (QUAL), we use the most widely known index,
the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International (TI) as of 2005.
This is the only year that we have data for the whole country sample. Notwithstand-
ing, since corruption is a feature that changes very sluggishly over time this is not a
major drawback. In this index, corruption is dened as the abuse of public oce for
private gain and it does not distinguish between administrative and political corrup-
tion. CPI-TI assesses and ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption
is perceived to exist among public ocials and politicians, drawing on dierent polls
and dierent surveys among business people, academics and risk analysts. The index
is computed as the simple average of the number of dierent surveys. It ranges from 0
(absolute corruption) to 10 (perfect institutional quality). More information regarding
the methodology of CPI-TI is provided by Lambsdor (1998) or www.transparency.org.
Central Bank Independence
In our model CBI is primarily proxied as a point in time. Data on central bank reform
dates have been collected from ocial Central Bank websites, legal databases and a
set of reference papers. Ination Targeting (IT) adoption dates are treated as central
bank reforms as well. Appendix B provides a list with the reforms, the amended acts
and the relevant sources.
Despite the fact that a central bank reform is undisputable, each reform gave a dif-
ferent level of independence, and it is in high levels of CBI that the government has a
higher incentive to strategically accumulate more debt. We accommodate for this fea-
ture with the introduction of a dummy variable that categorises the reformed countries
according to the level of independence given by the new Act, as measured by the GMT-
index. We use a dummy, instead of the actual level of CBI, to ameliorate the subjectiv-
ity biases created by combining many dierent sources, as well as own calculations. We
then interact this dummy with the level of corruption (quality) of each country, allow-
ing us to investigate the eect of corruption on debt at dierent stages of central bank
independence. Our CBI dummy is grouped in 4 categories for high, upper medium,
lower medium and low independence (IHIGHi; IUMEDi; ILMEDi; ILOWi). The
GMT-index is measured in a 0 (no CBI) to 16 (full CBI) scale, by adding up its two
components (political and economic autonomy). The categorisation of the countries
into the 4 classes was mainly based on deriving somehow equal size groups, while keep-
ing the level of CBI as coherent as possible. The majority of the countries fall into the
middle category, which triggered a further split into upper medium (IUMED) and
lower medium (ILMED). There is no country with a 0 score (the least independent
is Qatar with a score of 3) nor with 16. More precisely,
IHIGH =

1 if CBI  13
0 otherwise
IUMED =

1 if 11  CBI  12
0 otherwise
ILMED =

1 if 8  CBI  10
0 otherwise
ILOW =

1 if CBI  7
0 otherwise
Control Variables
The vector X includes a set of control variables that could be aecting the evolution
of the debt-to-GDP ratio, other than corruption.
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Since our dependent variable refer to debt as a share of GDP, variations in GDP
could be aecting DAi; DDi and GDi negatively. Hence, we construct a control vari-
able, GRGDPi, as the percentage change of annual average real GDP between 3 years
before and after the CB reform for each country, following the same process as with
GDi. Constant price GDP data are obtained from the IFS series of the IMF and the
World Development Indicators of the WB.22 Following the same reasoning, ination
could be impacting our dependent variable. However, the eect of ination in dierent
countries' debt to GDP ratio, dierence or growth rate is unclear. Some countries have
indexed debt, so ination is already accounted for, though for others with non-indexed
debt, we would expect variations in the rate of ination to be aecting the dierent
measures of debt (as a share of GDP) negatively. INFi is constructed the same way
as GGDPi, using CPI data (IFS, IMF), thus,
INFi =
PAi   PBi
PBi
 100; PA =
+3X
t=+1
Pt=3 and PB =
X
t= 2
Pt=3
Furthermore, we control for the exchange rate regime of each country, since the
more rigid the regime, the less scope for discretionary monetary policy. In this case, a
strategic manipulation of debt by the government will not aect monetary policy, i.e.
it will not induce the CB to respond. The government being aware of that, will not
necessarily use debt policy in such a way. The exchange rate regime of each country
was drawn by the de facto classication of Bubula and Otker Robe (2002). Firstly,
we include an exchange rate dummy (EXj ; j = 1; 2; 3; 4; 5) identifying 5 dierent ex-
change rate regimes that were in place or were introduced at the time of the CB reform;
Namely, EX1 for xed pegs, EX2 for horizontal bands, EX3 for crawling pegs and
crawling bands, EX4 for tightly managed oats, and EX5 for managed and indepen-
dent oats. In cases where a central bank reform was accompanied by an exchange
rate regime shift, we categorise the country according to the new regime. The majority
of countries fall into the last category, with some of the intermediate cases having a
small number of countries. Hence, we also include a broader categorisation of regimes,
EXFIXED;EXINTER;EXFLOAT , for xed, intermediate and oating ones.
Financial or currency crises are also accounted for, since they have sizeable eects
on the debt accumulation of the aected countries. For instance, the Asian nancial
crisis of 1997 caused Indonesia's debt-to-GDP to increase by 235% between 1997-1998.
The crisis dummy (CRISISi) gives a value of 1 to those countries which experienced
a nancial or currency crisis during the years of interest, that is, around the time of
the central bank reform, and a value of 0 otherwise. This dummy variable is capturing
all the major crises that occurred during the 1990s and beginning of 2000, since, in the
majority of the cases, the aftermath of the crisis initiated the introduction of a new
monetary policy framework, usually accompanied by an exchange rate regime shift.
The monetary design change was veried with a new or amended Central Bank Act,
or with a move to an ination targeting regime. We would expect the eect of this
variable on GDi to be positive. In addition note that since both public debt and GDP
are measured in current USD, if a country's overall debt has a large part of foreign
currency denominated debt, a sizeable currency devaluation would over-state the size
of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
22GDP deator data from the WDI were taken for Russia, Moldova, Ghana and Rwanda.
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Furthermore, we also control for the initial debt level of each country. For (1) this
is captured by DBi, the 3 years before the reform average of debt-to-GDP ratio. For
(2) and (3) we introduce a dummy for countries that are highly indebted. HIGHDBi
takes the value 1 if the country's 3 years before the reform average debt-to-GDP ratio
exceeds 80%. Countries with excessive debt-to-GDP ratios are facing a set of dierent
challenges; due to credit or other constraints, they might not be able to issue more
debt, but at the same time it could be dicult to implement a drastic debt disaccu-
mulation policy. Overall, countries with high starting debt/GDP levels experienced
small decreases after the reforms. A similar control variable accounts for the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries initiatives, initiated in 1996 and further enhanced in 1999.
This is a scheme of debt relief launched by the IMF and World Bank, to ensure sustain-
ability of external debt for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). After eligibility
for this scheme (decision point) is granted to a country, usually it takes some time
until the creditors start providing the full size of the decided debt relief (completion
point).23 We introduce the HIPCi dummy for countries that have their decision or
completion points under the two HIPC-initiatives included in the period examined.
This dummy variable, although an almost perfect subset of HIGHDBi, reects a very
dierent feature that impacts debt levels and growth rates.
Finally, we also include separate country dummies to exclude the possibility of
outliers or exceptional cases aecting the results, and to assess the impact of individual
countries on debt. The countries included in these dummies and the motivation for this
is further explained in the following sections. Appendix C provides detailed information
of the countries included in each control variable and sources documentation.
Summary Statistics
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the whole country sample, as well as for the
sub-groups of countries under the CRISIS, HIPC and HIGHDB clusters, and for
each geo-economic region. Table 5 shows pair-wise correlations across the main vari-
ables and 6 depicts scatter plots.
The two measures of debt evolution, DD;GD are signicantly positively correlated.
GD is scaled by the initial debt-to-GDP-ratio (DB), therefore, it is relatively greater
compared to DD when DB is low and vise versa. The selection of GD can, therefore,
be considered more preferable, since it allows for a better cross-country comparison,
given the great variation of the initial debt/GDP levels in our sample. As an illustra-
tion, let us consider the cases of UK (1992) and Hungary (1991). The dierence in
the debt-to-GDP ratio before and after their reform is around 10% for both countries
(DDUK = DDHUN ' 10%). Since the initial (3-year before) debt over GDP for the
UK is 33%, GDUK = 30:8%, whereas for Hungary DB is substantially higher at 73%.
Thus, the growth rate of debt-to-GDP for Hungary is much dierent and equal to
GDHUN = 13:8%.
The mean rate of growth of average debt-to-GDP for 3 years before and after the
reform (GD) is 5.8%, though the maximum is 87% and corresponds to Kyrgyz Re-
public (1997) which is included in the CRISIS dummy and the minimum is -62% for
23After the decision point is met, interim relief may start on the debt service falling due. Debt relief
refers to either debt cancelation or debt restructuring. For more information of on the HIPC initiative
see www.worldbank.org/hipc and IMF and WB (2005).
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Sierra Leone which revised its CB Act soon after the civil war ended and is part of the
HIPC cluster. Average DD is slightly negative. The 3 years-average Debt/GDP after
the reform (DA) is 60% for the whole country sample, with Nicaragua (NIC1 1992)
having the highest value.24 Countries that experienced a crisis during the examined
period have a much higher average debt evolution (both GD and DD) compared to the
overall sample, although average GD and DD for countries under the HIPC initiative
is considerably lower.
The average quality of institutions, as measured by the corruption perception in-
dex, for the whole sample is 5.2, ranging from severe corruption (1.9 for Nigeria) to
almost no corruption (9.7 for Iceland). The overall average level of central bank inde-
pendence is 10 (in a 0 (no CBI) - 16 (full CBI) scale). Average corruption for the group
of countries hit by a currency/ nancial crisis is relatively lower to the overall average,
though much lower for the heavily indebted poor countries. In terms of independence
the CRISIS group scores a bit higher than the overall one, but the HIPC one scores
the lowest.
Turning to the geo-economic classication, the IND group, which consists of 36
observations (23 advanced countries) has the highest average quality and central bank
independence levels. MENA (7 countries) is the second group in terms of quality levels,
but ranks last regarding central banks' independent status. The Easter European and
Central Asia (ECA) and Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) regions, despite being
characterised by fairly low average institutional quality, proceeded to noticeable central
bank reforms in the 1990s giving decisive steps towards independence. East Asia and
Pacic (EAP) has a higher level of institutional quality compared to ECA and LAC, but
much smaller central bank independence. Finally, Sub-Saharan countries (SSA) have
the lowest QUAL and the second lowest CBI. The crisis incidents are evenly allocated
among the IND (ERM crisis), ECA (Russian/ Asian crisis spillovers), EAP (Asian
crisis) and LAC (individual banking/ currency crises). HIPC is equally split between
SSA (Ghana, Rwanda, Sierra Leone) and LAC (Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua). Thus,
the MENA region entails no crisis-hit nor HIPC cases.
24Nicaragua, Kyrgyz Republic and Sierra Leone are some of the countries we account for as outliers
in our regressions.
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Among the three dierent dependent variables, DD has the smallest (and insigni-
cant) direct correlation with Quality. All others are negatively correlated with Quality,
albeit quantitatively small. As expected, DB and DA are strongly positively corre-
lated, a gure that will also be veried in our estimation results. There is a weak
positive correlation between institutional quality and central bank independence. This
reects recent developments, by which quite a few countries with relatively high cor-
ruption put forward ambitious central bank reforms. This is especially the case among
Latin America and former socialist economies. The positive correlation between insti-
tutional quality and independence could explain the negative correlation of CBI with
all dependent variables (except for DD).
Table 5: Pair-wise correlations among main variables
Corr.
(Prob.) QUAL DA DB DD GD CBI
QUAL 1
|{
DA -0.217 1
(0.025) |{
DB -0.187 0.869 1
(0.054) (0.000) |{
DD -0.032 0.131 -0.377 1
(0.748) (0.182) (0.000) |{
GD -0.171 0.034 -0.354 0.774 1
(0.079) (0.727) (0.000) (0.000) |{
CBI 0.188 -0.251 -0.268 0.066 -0.028 1
(0.053) (0.009) (0.006) (0.502) (0.774) |{
Figure 6: Scatter Plots among main variables
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Outlier countries are easily depicted from the scatter plots. These are predomi-
nantly, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Kyrgyz Republic, Uganda and Qatar.
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4 Estimation Results
Equations (1), (2) and (3) are estimated via OLS with White Heteroskedasticity-
Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance. In most cases, our model exhibits het-
eroskedasticity problems as identied by the White Test, which could indicate evidence
of non-linearities.
Results for DA and DD
As can be seen from Table's 6 rst three columns, regressions using the original equa-
tion, DAi =  + QUALi + Xi + DBi + i, indicate that DBi is capturing almost
all of the explanatory power and in all cases the coecient of DBi is not statistically
signicantly dierent from unity. This motivates the use of the rst dierences in the
debt-to-GDP ratio which is obtained by equation DDi = a+ bQUALi+ cXi+ui. The
next three columns of Table 6 show the results using (2).
In all cases, the coecient of QUAL is negative, signicant in the 5% or 1% level
and in the vicinity of 1.5-2%. The real GDP growth rate does seem to be signicant,
although quantitatively small. The impact of INF is even smaller. The CRISIS
dummy proves signicant under all equations and specications and accrues positively
on debt-to-GDP. On average, we observe that countries hit by a nancial crisis have
higher debt-to-GDP ratio or debt-to-GDP dierences in the range of 6-10 percent-
age points. On the other hand, the HIPC dummy seems to be of smaller statistical
signicance, albeit of a greater magnitude. HIPC turns insignicant, when we con-
trol for specic countries. The dummy variable accounting for a high initial debt
level (HIGHDB) is included in equation (2), indicating a signicantly negative eect.
Exchange rate regimes are also never signicant, using both ways of dummy categori-
sation. Selected results are depicted in columns (2) and (5) respectively. Finally,
columns (3) and (6) present results after controlling for selected exceptional cases and
the eect of QUAL still remains. The separate country dummies will be further ex-
plained in the next section.
The rst dierence in the debt-to-GDP average ratio is not capturing the eect of
the initial debt level, a measure that varies signicantly in our sample. DD is unscaled
in this respect, measuring the absolute dierence (as a share of GDP) between the debt
before and after the corresponding reform, but does not account for the size of this
dierence based on the initial level. This is avoided with the use of GD. Hence, Table
7 presents our results using the rate of growth of debt (average 3 years before and after
the CB reform) as the dependent variable.
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Table 6: Estimation Results for Equations (1) and (2) (No. of Observations 106)
Equation (1): DA Equation (2): DD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CONST 25.276 25.425 22.840 22.764 21.141 18.951
(3.253)*** (2.753)*** (3.689)*** (4.124)*** (4.736)*** (4.054)***
QUAL -1.602 -1.612 -1.543 -1.834 -1.690 -1.763
(-2.575)** (-2.048)** (-2.924)*** (-2.991)*** (0.675)** (-3.270)***
DB 0.890 0.890 0.876
(9.206)*** (9.188)*** (12.665)***
GRGDP -0.861 -0.856 -0.569 -0.876 -0.867 -0.553
(-2.815)*** (-2.848)*** (-2.748)*** (-2.732)*** (0.319)*** (-2.683)***
INF -0.041 -0.076 -0.057 -0.056 -0.069 -0.069
(-1.410) (-2.138)** (-2.154)** (-1.742)* (0.035)* (-2.432)**
CRISIS 7.803 9.743 6.565 8.608 9.409 7.849
(1.915)* (2.303)** (2.615)** (2.353)** (3.574)*** (3.596)***
HIPC -22.888 -25.247 -9.804 -23.698 -24.462 -11.219
(-1.709)* (-1.826)* (-1.200) (-1.719)* (13.814)* (-1.553)
HIGHDB -11.266 -11.030 -9.964
(-2.000)** (5.613)* (-2.154)**
EX1 -0.420
(-0.085)
EX2 -2.308
(-0.718)
EX3 6.961
(1.189)
EX4 -1.473
(-0.267)
EXINTER 4.028
(4.283)
EXFLOAT 0.262
(3.549)
NIC1 64.695 52.256
(5.401)*** (11.166)***
SLE -87.095 -97.159
(-7.082)*** (-10.452)***
KGZ 51.543 47.484
(13.699)*** (17.435)***
UGA -48.110 -48.390
(-7.663)*** (-8.847)***
R-square 0.832 0.835 0.926 0.411 0.332 0.734
Adj. R-square 0.822 0.818 0.918 0.376 0.261 0.706
SER 16.139 16.308 10.931 16.123 17.535 11.067
F-stat 81.582 48.141 118.800 11.528 4.718 26.194
Prob(F-stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: t-ratios in parenthesis
* = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1% levels of signicance
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Results for the growth rate of debt-to-GDP, GD
Overall, the eect of QUAL is signicant at the 1% level and ranges between 3.3 and
3.6%. This implies that a decrease in inistitutional quality (more corruption) by 1
unit will increase the rate of growth of (3-years average) debt-to-GDP ratio by ap-
proximately 3 percentage points. Given that average GD in our sample is 5.8%, the
impact of corruption on debt accumulation is sizeable.
GRGDP and INF have a negative impact on GD, but they are quantitatively
small. The dummies for HIGHDB, CRISIS and HIPC are always signicant both
statistically and quantitatively. As expected, HIGHDB and HIPC reduce GD con-
siderably, though CRISIS increases it. Their sizeable eects are attributable to the
fact that they include countries with very dierent debt processes compared to the
average. In most countries hit by a crisis, there were marked increases in their debt-
to-GDP ratios, in others where GD was not largely aected the impact of the crisis
is noticed in either their real GDP growth or ination. Sometimes, the eect of the
currency crisis is smoothed with the use of averages, as in the case of Indonesia, where
debt/GDP grew by 234% between 1997-98, though GD = 39%. Highly indebted coun-
tries are experiencing debt decreases after the reforms, a feature observed even more
strongly among the Heavily Indebt Poor Countries (HIPC).
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 7 include two dierent types of exchange rate regime
dummies, but they all turn to be insignicant. A number of reasons could explain
this result. Firstly, we have excluded all currency board arrangements or currency
unions (apart from the EMU and some countries in the Rand zone), in which cases
there is no scope for discretionary monetary policy.25 Secondly, regarding the rst
classication of exchange rates, each regime dummy includes a very dierent sample
both in terms of individual countries and in terms of size. For instance, EX2 refers to
horizontal bands and accounts only for 10 countries, the majority of which were in the
ERM system, however, EX5 includes 52 much more diverged observations. Nonethe-
less, a more general categorisation of regimes, where EXFIXED = EX1 + EX2,
EXINTER = EX3 + EX4 and EXFLOAT = EX5, is not alleviating the results.
In column (4) of Table 7 we follow the growth Barro-type specication more closely
by regressing the `growth rate' of debt-to-GDP for a given period using the `initial'
debt-to-GDP ratio as one of the regressors. The impact of the before the reform debt-
to-GDP is signicant and the importance of institutional quality prevails. In columns
(5) and (6) we control for some outlier countries, as a means of conrming that the
results are not driven by exceptional cases. The rst reform of Nicaragua (1992) is
a peculiar case that is not included in any of the dummy variables. Despite a huge
3 years-average debt-to-GDP ratio for before 1992 (227%), Nicaragua's debt/GDP
increased further after the reform. Sierra Leone (2000) which apart from becoming
a HIPC, it went out of a civil war on that year, and both eects contributed to
a sizeable debt/GDP decrease, and Kyrgyz Republic (1997), which experienced the
highest increase in GD due to the negative spill-over of the Russian nancial crisis.
Despite the exclusion of those countries, the results remain robust with the impact
of QUAL in the same range as before, however the signicance of HIPC control
disappears in (6).
25Countries of the Euro Area are considered as independent oaters. Alternative specications were
they are classied as a separate group, does not alter the empirical ndings.
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Results for dierent levels of Central Bank Independence
In general, our results are in line with the theoretical implications of the model in
Dimakou (2006); more corruption can explain a part of the higher debt-to-GDP ac-
cumulation of dierent countries after more CBI is granted. However, up to now our
empirical investigation does not account for the level of independence. The individual
Act reforms, although being viewed as reforms in the direction of improved autonomy,
gave dierent degrees of independence to their central banks. Following the hypothe-
sis outlined at the beginning of the section, we would expect the eect of institutional
quality to be stronger when high levels of CBI are legislated, rather than when a mon-
etary policy regime shift is only partial. From an empirical point of view, we account
for this feature of the model by interacting the quality of institutions with a dummy
variable reecting the level of independence the central bank reform in question gave.26
This way we can establish the impact of quality on GD for 4 levels of CBI. Results are
presented in Table 8.
Our empirical results verify this conjecture. The impact of quality on debt-to-GDP
accumulation is the highest for the countries that shifted to very high levels of CBI,
and gradually decreases as the level of CBI introduced by the central bank reform
lessens. The interaction variables of quality with high, upper medium and low CBI are
signicant under all specications. According to our results, within the reforms that
gave high degree of independence, a unit rise in corruption (lower QUAL), increases
the change of the debt/GDP ratio by 4 percentage points. Within the group of up-
per medium CBI, the impact of corruption on debt-to-GDP is around 3.6 points and
among the countries that their reforms gave very little independence, the impact of
corruption is lower and equal to 2.5. However, the interaction variable QUAL*ILMED
turns out to be insignicant and of lower magnitude than expected.
The two clusters that incorporate the smallest reforms, include economies from all
geo-economic regions, as well as the majority of low-income countries. The diversity of
cases is also reected on the timing of the reforms. The ILMED group includes 5 IND
countries, which apart from Canada refer to prior to 1995 Act amendments. Reformed
central banks from LAC and ECA are scattered throughout the 1990s, and most of
these countries exhibit high corruption levels. The last four countries in the group
come from SSA and MENA. The ILOW group is dominated by SSA, MENA and EAP
countries. The few IND countries refer to either older reforms or to more recent Nordic
cases. All the Asian crisis hit and HIPC countries are distributed in those two groups.27
Concentrating on the level of independence given to the reformed central banks,
the ILMED group is characterised overall by low political autonomy and its main im-
provements compared to ILOW come from economic autonomy aspects. In that sense,
and considering that a certain level of political autonomy is also required for economic
autonomy to be more relevant, those two groups that exhibit lower levels of CBI do not
dier so much. For this reason, in column (2) of Table 8 we add the last two groups of
CBI and the lack of signicance is no longer observed. With three categorisations for
the level of CBI, all interaction variables are signicant and the impact of worsening
26Ideally, we would be interested in the change in CBI, rather than the absolute degree the new law
gave. However, unavailability of information regarding the level of independence before the reform
does not allow us to explore this issue.
27Bolivia is classied as HIPC and is incorporated in the IHIGH group.
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Table 8: Estimation Results for Equation (3): GD using CBI levels (No. of observations 106)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Const. 33.612 34.150 36.802 36.673 34.569 38.883
(4.215)*** (4.407)*** (4.809)*** (4.757)*** (4.421)*** (4.807)***
QUAL
GRGDP -0.776 -0.773 -0.821 -0.805 -0.772 -0.792
(-2.808)*** (-2.860)*** (-2.932)*** (-2.881)*** (-2.662)*** (-2.891)***
INF -0.135 -0.133 -0.137 -0.144 -0.146 -0.116
(-2.480)** (-2.497)** (-2.555)** (-2.634)*** (-2.665)*** (-2.299)**
HIGHDB -16.415 -16.882 -15.849 -17.645 -16.713
(-3.574)*** (-3.633)*** (-3.359)*** (-3.847)*** (-3.616)***
CRISIS 31.226 31.455 32.141 32.757 29.922 31.329
(5.569)*** (5.782)*** (5.746)*** (5.849)*** (6.088)*** (5.286)***
HIPC -15.277 -14.610 -14.227 -12.530 -8.030 -14.247
(-2.116)** (-1.963)* (-1.886)* (-1.658) (-1.174) (-1.680)*
QUAL*IHIGH -3.988 -4.071 -4.384 -4.358 -4.216 -4.032
(-4.026)*** (-4.266)*** (-4.641)*** (-4.582)*** (-4.429)*** (-4.421)***
QUAL*IUMED -3.616 -3.723 -4.098 -4.065 -3.659 -3.637
(-3.301)*** (-3.556)*** (-3.910)*** (-3.853)*** (-3.573)*** (-3.644)***
QUAL*ILMED -1.733 -3.568 -3.651 -3.121 -3.130
(-1.027) (-2.710)*** (-2.774)*** (-2.420)** (-2.411)**
QUAL*ILOW -2.549 -2.999 -2.926 -2.686 -2.592
(-2.275)** (-2.760)*** (-2.695)*** (-2.514)** (-2.277)**
QUAL*ILMED+
QUAL*ILOW
-2.326
(-2.015)**
DB -0.138
(-2.008)**
EXFIXED
EXFLOAT
AUS 50.810 51.527 48.570 46.409
(6.497)*** (6.601)*** (6.190)*** (5.617)***
MLT1 45.097 45.576 43.608 43.567
(7.679)*** (7.773)*** (7.202)*** (7.320)***
NIC1 30.603 30.477
(4.865)*** (4.844)***
SLE -29.644
(-2.863)***
KGZ 57.156
(10.062)***
R-square 0.487 0.484 0.533 0.545 0.595 0.523
Adj. R-square 0.438 0.441 0.479 0.486 0.535 0.467
SER 19.955 19.911 19.224 19.091 18.208 19.449
No of Observ. 106 106 106 106 106 106
F-stat 10.110 11.353 9.770 9.275 9.542 9.351
Prob(F-stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: t-ratios in parenthesis
* = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1% levels of signicance
quality as the level of CBI is higher on the rate of debt accumulation increases.
In order to identify the underlying reasons for the insignicance of the ILMED
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dummy, we examine closely the composition of countries in this group. Firstly, it is
the group with the lowest standard deviation in quality levels, a feature driven by
the lack of high quality countries relative to the other groups. Australia (AUS 1993)
and Malta (MLT1) have the highest and fourth highest quality in the ILMED group,
though they rank 9th and 23rd in the overall sample respectively. At the same time,
both countries experienced sizeable increases in their debt-to-GDP-ratio after their
central bank reforms, which are not accounted for in the CRISIS dummy. They both
suered from severe recessions around the time of their reforms which caused substan-
tial debt increases.28 In column (3) of Table 8 we control for those two countries with
the use of separate country dummies and we do observe that the eect of quality within
the lower medium levels of CBI gets signicant both statistically and quantitatively.
Nicaragua (NIC1 1992) and Sierra Leone (SLE), countries we have been controlling
for in all previous regressions, are in the ILMED group. We control for those (as well
as Kyrgyz) and conclude that the eect of quality in all levels of independence remains
signicant. The eect and signicance of all other control variables does not change
from the regressions of Table 7. Exchange rate regime dummies, although not pre-
sented here, are again insignicant without altering the main ndings. On the other
hand, GRGDP and INF are signicant, albeit of small size. The rest three dummies,
HIGHDB, CRISIS and HIPC, are in all specications signicant quantitatively
and statistically.29
The results of Table 8 suggest the presence of non-linearities in the impact of bu-
reaucratic corruption on debt at dierent levels of CBI. In testing the signicance of
these non-linearities we perform a set of coecient restriction tests (Wald test) and
factor breakpoint tests. The results are mixed. In all specications, the signicant
dierence among the coecient of IHIGH and ILOW is conrmed. Further, when
Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Kyrgyz are excluded, the factor breakpoint test suggests
that the breaks, as identied by the four independence clusters, are signicant.
We perform dierent robustness checks and the results remain unchanged. Firstly,
we perform the analysis for dierent measures of debt, as shown in equations (1),
(2) and (3), and quality constitutes a signicant factor. Secondly, as depicted in
Appendix D, we exclude all the countries that were hit by a currency crisis (CRISIS)
and the ones that were accepted in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiatives
(HIPC), and we nd similar results. Furthermore, regressions are run for all of the
three specications, excluding the observations where residuals were above (below) 1.5
and 2 standard deviations from the regression line. This way we isolate the eect of
outliers or extraordinary individual cases. Again, as it can be seen from Appendix D,
the results remain robust.
28In the case of Australia, the reform date, although widely accepted as the IT date, refers to
the unilateral decision of the Reserve Bank to follow an ination targeting regime. Another widely
accepted view is that the recession was responsible for the drop of ination and hence for the success
of the IT regime, which followed the recession. See for instance Macfarlane (1998)
29Again, HIPC becomes insignicant when all separate country dummies are included.
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5 Conclusion
Central bank independence has become a common formula for the elimination of ina-
tionary boosts and scal dominance phenomena in the past couple of decades in both
the developed and developing world. An analysis of the changes in the legal status
of central banks, as envisaged in the central bank acts, demonstrates the extent of
frequency and gravity of such reforms that took place during 1990s and beginning of
2000s. We investigate the evolution of central bank reforms during that period for a
set of 77 countries, 23 advanced and 54 developing per geo-economic group.
Advanced economies attain the highest levels of central bank independence, fol-
lowed by ECA (Europe and Central Asia) and LAC (Latin America and Caribbean).
Increased independence in the advanced group is merely attributed to the Euro Area
economies and the legal requirements for integration into the European Monetary
Union which proclaimed for specic amendments to ensure both economic and political
autonomy of central banks. Moreover, and perhaps contrary to conventional wisdom,
ECA and LAC rank higher than the non-Euro advanced economies. Those two regions,
although driven be dierent political and/or economic considerations achieved marked
increases in the legal independence of their monetary policy making. The last three
geo-economic groups studied, namely MENA (Middle East and North Africa), EAP
(East Asia and Pacic) and SSA (Sub Saharan Africa), have substantially lower levels
of independence, despite recent attempts for improved autonomy and modernisation
of central banking.
However, despite the uniformity of such a process towards increased independence,
monetary and scal performance has been very diverse. We ascertain that corruption
can interact with scal policy by shifting the nancing of government spending and
can be responsible for expanding debt processes of economies that constitute indepen-
dent central banks. In a cross-sectional setting, central bank independence is primarily
approximated as that point in time that a decisive reform took place. We then explore
the impact of bureaucratic corruption in the evolution of debt, gross decit and debt
accumulation before and after that point.
Consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of Dimakou (2006), quality of insti-
tutions is an important factor in explaining cross-country debt-to-GDP growth. After
an important central bank reform and controlling for a set of other factors, we nd that
more corruption leads to higher debt accumulation. More importantly, complementing
the analysis with a measure for the level of independence each reform gave strengthens
the results; the impact of corruption is greater, the higher the independence that was
granted. Thus, we provide evidence that the impact of corruption on debt exhibits
non-linearities. The results are robust to a set of control variables and dierent speci-
cations and sub-samples.
Our empirical ndings on the impact that bureaucratic corruption has on scal
responses, given a monetary policy reform, can explain the lack of a consistent rela-
tionship between central bank independence and ination. This is further strengthened
by the ndings of Al-Marhubi (2000) that conrms the adverse impact of corruption on
ination for a set of 41 countries. Thus, improving the quality of institutions is vital in
order to avoid sharp increases of debt after monetary policy reforms, and any adverse
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implications such a scal policy stance may have on the actual autonomy of monetary
policy making or price stability. Quality of monetary and scal institutions can be con-
sidered as complements, rather than substitutes, hence attention should be directed
to improving the quality of both the monetary and the governmental institutions and
not the one or the other alone.
A Appendix
Central Bank Independence, Methodology and Evolution
A.1 Appendix GMT-index
Table A.1: GMT Criteria
Political Autonomy (PA)
(1) Governor appointed without government involvement
(2) Governor appointed for more than 5 years
(3) Board appointed without government involvement
(4) Board appointed for more than 5 years
(5) No mandatory participation of government representatives in the Board
(6) No governmental approval is required for formulating MP
(7) Requirements forcing CB to pursue monetary stability among its primary
objectives
(8) Legal protections strengthening CB's position in case of conict with
government
Economic Autonomy (EA)
(1) No automatic procedure for government to obtain direct credit facilities
from CB
(2) Direct credit facilities extended at market rates
(3) Credit on a temporary basis
(4) Credit of limited amount
(5) CB does not participate in primary market for public debt
(6) CB is responsible for setting the Discount Rate
(7a) CB has no responsibility for overseeing the banking sector
(7b) CB shares responsibility with other institutional entities
A.2 Advanced Economies
The following graphs depict the evolution of CBI per country using available data
from Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991), Tavelli, Tullio, and Spinelli (1998) and
Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto (2006).
We measure the level of central bank independence using the GMT-index for the
following countries: Luxembourg, Finland, Iceland, Malta Norway and Sweden. We
abstract from assessing the level of independence for the two EMU-members, since
due to harmonisation, their score would be very close to the one obtained by the rest
EMU-participants (in the proximity of 14).
The core of the CB Act of Iceland dated back to 1986, when the discussions for a
reform started in 2001. As analysed in Petursson (2000) Iceland (and Norway) scored
among the lowest in many aspects of CBI, as examined by Fry, Julius, Mahadeva,
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Figure A.1: CBI Evolution in Euro Area (10) economies
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Figure A.2: CBI Evolution in non-Euro Advanced Economies
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Roger, and Sterne (2000) as of 1998. The new Act that came in force in May 2001 up-
graded the level of both political and economic autonomy substantially. Price stability
became the main objective of monetary policy and an IT regime was adopted; the
term in oce of the Board was extended and the composition of the main governing
bodies changed. Also, in the area of economic autonomy, instrument independence
was formulated, together with a de facto ban on CB credit to the public sector. The
CB Reform ended in an increase in the level of CBI of Iceland, comparable with the
ones of the rest of advanced economies. Norway has also been characterised by lim-
ited CBI, especially in terms of political autonomy, as suggested by both JP-Morgan
(2000) and Lybek and Morris (2004) with political appointment of governors, no clear
mandate of objectives, need of governmental approval and no prohibition of monetary
nancing. Since 2001, Norwegian government has dened an ination target of 2.5%
(Government Regulation, March 2001), however, the amendment of December 1999
(in eect from April 2000) did not provide for a decisive step towards legal CBI.30
Sweden, though it opted out of the EMU it amended the CB Act in January 1999
attaining a level of CBI similar to the EMU-members.CBI evolution can also be cap-
tured by comparing the Tavelli, Tullio, and Spinelli (1998) GMT-score as of 1997 and
the one constructed by us. The level of CBI in Sweden increased from 6 in 1997 to
14 in 1999. Malta has had two important amendments to the CB status, in 1994 and
2002, with the latter being driven by the aspiration of EU-participation. The 2002
CB reform prohibited monetary nancing and gave to Malta the maximum score in
30Even the 2003 CB Act Amendment does not improve the legal status of the Norges Bank in the
political autonomy aspect. Still important monetary policy decisions have to be submitted to the
Ministry, and there is no clear mandate of price stability, rather the CB shall conduct its operations
in accordance with the economic policy guidelines of the government. The most relevant amendment
of this reform refers to the prohibition of CB direct credit to the government, a provision that came
in force from 1 January of 2005. However, due to the lack of data for the rest of variables, the 2003
reform is not included in our empirical analysis.
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terms of economic autonomy. Less advances were achieved in the sphere of political
autonomy, while price stability became the primary objective. Note, however, that the
criteria required by EU for EMU participation dier from the ones of the GMT-index;
for instance, the GMT-index is giving a score only if the term in oce of the Governor
or the Board is (strictly) more than 5 years, though the EU treaty does not prescribe
such a condition.
Table A.2: GMT-index recent CB Reforms - IND
Political Autonomy
Country CBR PA(1) PA(2) PA(3) PA(4) PA(5) PA(6) PA(7) PA(8) PA
ISL 2001 1 1 1 1 1 5
MLT1 1994 1 1 1 3
MLT2 2002 1 1 1 3
NOR 2000 1 1 1 3
SWE2 1999 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
Economic Autonomy
Country CBR EA(1) EA(2) EA(3) EA(4) EA(5) EA(6) EA(7a) EA(7b) EA
ISL 2001 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
MLT1 1994 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
MLT2 2002 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
NOR 2000 1 1 1 1 4
SWE2 1999 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
GMT-index constructed using the CB Acts as reported in Table B.1, expect for Sweden (Act
amended as of 2006) and Norway (available Act No.43 of 2005, but used the provisions as
amended in 2000 (for EA(1)-(5)) after communication with the Norges Bank.)
A.3 Europe and Central Asia (ECA)
A.3.1 Updated GMT-index for selected ECA countries
Maliszewski (2000) does not report recent GMT-index data for Czech Republic (1998),
Latvia (1998), Slovak (2001), Slovenia (2002), as well as Cyprus (2002) and Turkey
(2001). The CB reforms in Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia follow the
initial major reforms in the beginning of 1990s which focused at the transition from
plan to market. The new reforms aim at further improving the level of CBI in line with
recent practices worldwide. For Czech we use the Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto's
(2006) GMT-index, which shows that the CBI increase is attributable exclusively to
improvements in economic autonomy. At the same time (January 1998) the Czech Na-
tional Bank signaled a new monetary policy framework and started explicit ination
targeting. For Latvia, the 1998 CB Act amendment explicitly prevents the Minister of
Finance from temporarily postponing decisions of the Board (Art 25), and prohibits
direct credit to the government (Art 30). In Slovenia, the 2002 amendments improved
EA and specically prohibited government decits monetisation; PA was already at a
very high level, though responsibility for banking supervision still remains within the
CB.
In Slovak, Act No. 149/2001 took eect as of 1 May 2001 and ensured the full im-
plementation of the acquis in terms of independence of the central bank. Apart from
that this amendment introduced the prohibition of monetary nancing of the public
sector. Art. 25 of the Act prohibits overdraft facilities by not allowing a debit balance
in the Treasury's accounts with the CB. Nonetheless, there is no provision for CB's
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direct participation in the primary debt market. Furthermore, PA in Slovak is still
limited. Note, however, that there is a dierence between the GMT political crite-
ria and the EU acquis requirements with the latter not specifying the years in oce
for the Board of the CB, just require the political cycle to be bigger. Cyprus's 2002
CB legislation amendment was mainly triggered by EU participation aspiration, and
ended in primarily EA improvements. On the other hand, Cyprus CB Act still lags
behind especially in terms of political autonomy and ranks among the lowest ones in
the region (together with Slovakia). Slovenia and Cyprus (and Malta) joined the EMU
in January 2007 and 2008 respectively. The CB reforms of 2007 though are too recent
to be included in our empirical analysis and thus we do not assess their improvement
in terms of CBI. The Turkish nancial crisis of 2000-2001 lead, among other things,
to a CB reform which generated a set of amendments, including the primacy of price
stability, reorganisation of the CB's Board with the creation of the Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC) and prohibition of CB's direct credit to the government.
Table A.3: GMT-index recent CB Reforms - ECA (own calculations)
Political Autonomy
Country CBR PA(1) PA(2) PA(3) PA(4) PA(5) PA(6) PA(7) PA(8) PA
CYP 2002 1 1 1 3
LVA2 1998 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
SVK2 2001 1 1 1 1 4
SVN2 2002 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
TUR 2001 1 1 1 3
Economic Autonomy
Country CBR EA(1) EA(2) EA(3) EA(4) EA(5) EA(6) EA(7a) EA(7b) EA
CYP 2002 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
LVA2 1998 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
SVK2 2001 1 1 1 1 1 5
SVN2 2002 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
TUR 2001 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
Own calculations assessing the amended Acts as reported in Table B.1 expect for Latvia. In
this case, due to unavailability of the 1998 Act, we used the most recent one (last amendment
June 2005).
A.4 Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)
Updated GMT-index for selected LAC countries
CBI evolution in the region requires the combination of many dierent sources which
results in a few shortcomings the main one being the incompatibility generated due
to dierent authors' subjectivity bias. Each author's interpretation will tend to dier
and hence combining the results will create a bias. This seems to be considerably
apparent in the case of the LAC countries. We observed many dierent and contrasting
GMT scoring in the cases where laws' assessments of dierent sources overlapped. The
following table presents the own GMT-index calculations. Jacome and Vazquez (2005)
give a GMT score for Chile, referred to as the post-1989 reform index, which diers
from the own calculated by us. The same applies for Mexico, when comparing ours
with the one reported by Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto (2006). Note that in the
case of Mexico, even the one reported by Jacome and Vazquez (2005) for the after
1994 reform is dierent. If we move further to the disaggregate scores, the situation
becomes even more problematic.
In both cases we chose ours GMT-index.
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The case of Mexico
Source CBR PA EA TA
JV post-1994 8 5 13
Own 1999 6 6 12
ALS as of 2003 5 6 11
Figure A.4 uses Jacome and Vazquez's (2005) data to show individual changes in
the level of CBI in the region during the rst wave of CB reforms of 1990s.
Figure A.3: Changes in the level of CBI in LAC, for the rst CB Reform of 1990s
COL1 (1992)
VEN1 (1992)
BOL (1995)
BOL (1995)
COL1 (1992)
CRI (1995)
CRI (1995)
ECU1 (1992)
ECU1 (1992)
SLV1 (1991)
SLV1 (1991)
HND (1996)
HND (1996)
MEX1 (1994)
MEX1 (1994)
NIC1 (1992)NIC1 (1992)
PRY (1995)
PRY (1995)
PER (1993)
PER (1993)
URY (1995)
URY (1995)
VEN1 (1992)
Average 
Average 
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Before After
BOL
(1995)
COL1
(1992)
CRI
(1995)
ECU1
(1992)
SLV1
(1991)
HND
(1996)
MEX1
(1994)
NIC1
(1992)
PRY
(1995)
PER
(1993)
URY
(1995)
VEN1
(1992)
Average 
Source: Jacome and Vazquez (2005)
Table A.4 shows the own GMT-index assessment that refers to some recent reforms
taking place in the region, namely Chile (1999), Mexico (1999), Nicaragua (1999) and
Venezuela (2001). The recent reforms of Nicaragua (NIC2 - 1999) and Venezuela
(VEN2 - 2001) gave a GMT-index which does not dier from the one attained by the
previous reforms. This could hold either because amendments referred to provisions the
GMT-index does not account for (e.g. accountability, transparency) or amendments
that did not aect the score or the assessments come from dierent sources. Finally,
in the empirical work, we also take into account the reforms of 1998 and 2000 for
Ecuador and Colombia respectively, for which we have no information for the level of
central bank independence. Colombia moved to an ination targeting regime in 2000
without a formal change to the CB status. Actually, an ination target has been being
announced since 1991, however the CB followed a gradual move towards fully-edged
ination targeting and it was only when the currency was let to oat in September
1999 that such a regime became formal.31
A.5 East Asian and Pacic (EAP)
Updated GMT-index for selected EAP countries
All the reforms in this region are assessed by us. Bank of Indonesia has been formally
independent since the passage of the new Act in May 1999 which granted both instru-
ment and goal independence. Apart from being responsible for banking supervision,
CB fullls all other economic autonomy criteria, though political autonomy could be
further enhanced. Without having a fully-edged ination targeting regime, mone-
tary policy is directed towards keeping headline ination down, with the adoption of
a ceiling ination target of 5%. China lacks severely in almost all aspects of political
31For more details on the implementation of ination targeting in Colombia see Gomez, Uribe, and
Vargas (2002).
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Table A.4: GMT-index recent CB Reforms - LAC (own calculations)
Political Autonomy (PA)
Country CBR PA(1) PA(2) PA(3) PA(4) PA(5) PA(6) PA(7) PA(8) PA
CHL2 1999 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
MEX2 1999 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
NIC2 1999 1 1 2
VEN2 2001 1 1 1 1 4
Economic Autonomy (EA)
Country CBR EA(1) EA(2) EA(3) EA(4) EA(5) EA(6) EA(7a) EA(7b) EA
CHL2 1999 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
MEX2 1999 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
NIC2 1999 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
VEN2 2001 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
GMT-indexes refer to the CB Acts as depicted in Table B.1, expect for Chile for which the
only available Act is the only last amended in January 2006.
autonomy; monetary policy is set by the CB with advice from the Monetary Policy
Committee (which consists of many government representatives) and under the ap-
proval of the State Council (Cabinet). The 1995 CB Act establishes the MPC, which
started operating from July 1997. Economic autonomy is much higher with China
(together with Indonesia) attaining the maximum score in the region. There is formal
prohibition of direct credit to government and participation in the primary debt mar-
ket. Moreover, though not included in our empirical analysis, China further amended
its CB Status in 2003 without aecting the already limited level of political autonomy.
The 2003 Act provides for the China Banking Regulatory Commission to take over
banking supervision and for the State Council to establish a coordinating mechanism
for nancial supervision and regulation. Also, in practice independence is very low
(JP-Morgan 2000). The CB of Philippines was established as an independent central
monetary authority pursuant to the Constitution and the New CB Act of 1993 (as the
successor of the old CB, originally established in 1949). Under the new act, primacy of
price stability is explicit, the CB no longer undertakes quasi-scal activities, and lend-
ing to the government is contained. Moreover, Philippines moved to explicit ination
targeting in 2002. Despite the revised Act of 1994, CBI in Malaysia is limited. CB's
role is viewed as complementary to government development aims and scal policy,
hence there is little scope for actual CBI. Government participants (Secretary-General
of the Treasury) in the Board, need for government approval in many of its operations
restrain political autonomy.
Singapore is the country with the lowest GMT-index. The Monetary Authority of
Singapore is not formally independent from the government; the Board is dominated
by government participants with short terms in oce and multiplicity of objectives.
Economic Autonomy is also restricted with vague provisions for the terms of lending to
the government and responsibility over banking supervision. In the wake of the crisis,
the Bank of Thailand came under pressure to reorganise. Moreover, Thailand shifted
to an ination targeting regime in 2000. However, despite a Draft Bill Law of 2000 we
have not been able to obtain the new CB Act. However, given that Thailand scores the
lowest among our studied group, using the data of Ahsan, Skully, and Wickramanayake
(2006b), we could say that CBI is limited.
Until the currency crisis of 1997, the Bank of Korea was under the jurisdiction
of the Ministry of Finance and its policies were heavily inuenced by governmental
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goals. The 1998 CB Act improves upon the previous status and strengthens the CBI
of the Bank of Korea. Price stability becomes the primary objective and there are
no government ocials in the Board, however terms in oce are 4 years or less and
appointments are politically driven. Furthermore, direct credit to the government is
allowed and terms and conditions for such advances are vague. Banking supervision is
in the sphere of the Financial Supervisory Commission.
Table A.5: GMT-index recent CB Reforms - EAP (own calculations)
Political Autonomy
Country CBR PA(1) PA(2) PA(3) PA(4) PA(5) PA(6) PA(7) PA(8) PA
CHN 1995 1 1 2
IDN 1999 1 1 1 1 4
KOR 1998 1 1 1 3
MYS 1994 1 1 2
PHL1 1993 1 1 1 1 4
SGP 1998 1 1 2
Economic Autonomy
Country CBR EA(1) EA(2) EA(3) EA(4) EA(5) EA(6) EA(7a) EA(7b) EA
CHN 1995 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
IDN 1999 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
KOR 1998 1 1 1 1 4
MYS 1994 1 1 1 1 4
PHL1 1993 1 1 1 1 1 5
SGP 1998 1 1 1 3
Own calculations assessing the amended Acts as reported in Table B.1 expect for Malaysia,
Singapore and Korea. We used the most recent available acts (2006, 2007 and 2003 respec-
tively).
The Table below describes the level of CBI as measured by CBIG-index of Ah-
san, Skully, and Wickramanayake (2006b) and provides a comparison with our GMT-
index.32
We observe that EAP as a whole is lacking in the legal aspect of the CBIG-index.
This sub-index corresponds to the procedures of appointment/dismissal of the gover-
nor, the term in oce and the responsibility of the CB as a regulatory body for the
banking sector. This draws in line with our ndings in terms of political autonomy.
32We exclude 2 of the CBIG sub-indexes in order to improve comparability with the GMT. Nonethe-
less, the remaining sub-indexes include dierent criteria and hence in some cases comparisons may be
misleading. Unfortunately, we do not have more disaggregated data for CBIG-index.
Table A.6: CBIG-index: EAP
CBIG GMT
Total 1) Legal 2) Political 3) Price St. 5) MP TA
PHL 0.7429 0.3600 1.0000 0.8900 0.7217 9
KOR 0.7082 0.6000 1.0000 0.8444 0.3883 7
MYS 0.7070 0.3200 0.9778 0.8900 0.6400 6
CHN 0.6898 0.2024 0.6667 0.8900 1.0000 7
IND 0.5852 0.3992 0.5344 0.7636 0.6436 10
THA 0.4833 0.1000 0.8678 0.6220 0.3433 na
SGP na na na na na 5
Source: CBIG - Ahsan, Skully, and Wickramanayake (2006b)
GMT - own calculations
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The political aspect, which assesses the turnover rate of the governor,and the par-
ticipation of government ocials in the board, is high on average, except for China and
Indonesia. Regarding the sub-index of monetary policy and monetary nancing of the
budget, China score the highest, followed by Philippines, though Korea and Thailand
score the lowest.
A.6 Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
Updated GMT-index for selected SSA countries
Most African countries inherited rule-based monetary frameworks and xed exchange
rate regimes, mainly currency boards, at independence. Though their evolution varies
signicantly after independence, we can distinguish two main patterns depending on
the sphere of inuence. Regarding the British zone, the West and East African currency
boards were abandoned soon after independence and various new regimes were adopted.
On the other hand, in the CFA Franc zone, the greater involvement of France in
the post-independence period ensured that only a few countries of CFA broke away
(Honohan and O'Connell (1997), Masson and Pattillo (2005)). No CFA Franc zone
country is examined here.
Heavy reliance on monetary nancing of government decits and subsequent bouts
of ination were observed in many African countries. The scal stance and the -
nancing of scal decits has been both a problem and a driving force in the monetary
regime evolution. Despite the set of economic and nancial reforms from mid-1980s
onwards, nancial systems in SSA are still underdeveloped. Nonetheless, the nancial
system is still small. Nowadays, apart from Kenya, South Africa and Ghana, coun-
tries with small populations (e.g. Lesotho, Namibia, Rwanda) and countries recovering
from monobank systems (e.g. Ethiopia) have a small number of banks. At the same
time, domestic debt markets are also underdeveloped in the SSA region, partly due
to shallow nancial sectors and to more favourable terms on foreign borrowing from
international aid agencies or on grant terms. High external debt is a prominent feature
in the region, which, among other things, did not facilitate the evolution of the do-
mestic debt markets and government securities markets. There is, however, a marked
dierence between Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and non-HIPC countries,
with the former ones having much less developed debt markets and less reliance on
domestic debt compared to the latter ones. Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, South
Africa have been relying on domestic debt since 1980s, in contrast to others such as
Ghana and Namibia that either have small debt markets or have recently increased
their reliance on domestic debt.33
Overall, the level of independence in the region is low and mainly attributed to eco-
nomic autonomy criteria. Kenya (KEN-1997), Rwanda (RWA-1997) and Sierra Leone
(SLE-2000) rank on the top, with scores almost equally distributed between the two as-
pects of independence. The Reserve Bank of South Africa is one of the few joint-stock
companies34 CBs and, as expected in these cases, a portion of the Board members is
appointed by the shareholders. Note also that South Africa switched to a fully-edged
ination targeting regime in February 2000. However, the 2000 CB Act amendment
only refers to changes in the minimum reserves requirements provisions; even the pri-
mary objective of the CB still reads \...to protect the value of the currency of the
33See Christensen (2005) for more details on the evolution of domestic debt in SSA.
34Joint-stock companies CBs are Austria, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Japan, Pakistan, Switzerland and
USA; 9 CBs out of 101 (Lybek and Morris 2004).
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Republic in the interest of balanced and sustainable economic growth...". Hence, the
GMT score remains the same under both amendments. Contrary to the results of
Mehran et al (1998) we nd that South Africa enjoys a level of independence that
ranks among the lowest ones in the region.
Table A.7: GMT-index recent CB Reforms - SSA (own calculations)
Political Autonomy (PA)
Country CBR PA(1) PA(2) PA(3) PA(4) PA(5) PA(6) PA(7) PA(8) PA
GHA 2002 1 1 2
KEN 1997 1 1 1 3
LSO 2000 1 1 1 3
NAM 1997 1 1 1 3
NGA 1999 1 1 2
RWA 1997 1 1 1 1 4
SLE 2000 1 1 1 1 4
ZAF1 1996 1 1 1 1 4
ZAF2 2000 1 1 1 1 4
UGA 1993 1 1 2
Economic Autonomy (EA)
Country CBR EA(1) EA(2) EA(3) EA(4) EA(5) EA(6) EA(7a) EA(7b) EA
GHA 2002 1 1 1 1 4
KEN 1997 1 1 1 1 1 5
LSO 2000 1 1 1 1 4
NAM 1997 1 1 1 3
NGA 1999 1 1 1 1 4
RWA 1997 1 1 1 1 4
SLE 2000 1 1 1 1 4
ZAF1 1996 1 1 2
ZAF2 2000 1 1 2
UGA 1993 1 1 1 1 1 5
GMT-indexes refer to the CB Acts as depicted in Table B.1.
Our empirical analysis also includes the CB reforms of Burundi (BDI- 1993), and
Ethiopia (ETH - 1993), for which we did not manage to retrieve the CB Acts. Hence,
we draw conclusions regarding their CBI levels based on the information of Mehran et
al (1998) and their CB websites.
A.7 MENA
Central bank independence in the Middle East is very low and reforms are infrequent.
Qatar Monetary Authority (QMA) was established in 1973 (Law No. 7 of May 1973),
soon after the discontinuation of the Qatar - Dubai currency board arrangement. This
coincided with the introduction of a new currency, the Qatari Riyal. QMA was respon-
sible for maintaining the stability of the QR exchange rate. In 1993 (Law No.15) the
Qatar Central Bank was established, inheriting the exchange rate targeting of QMA
and the same parity with the USD. Even when incorporating the 1997 (Law No.19)
amendments, CBI is almost non-existent. The 1997 amendments focus on the reserve
requirements provisions, oshore banking and on provisions related to regulation and
supervision of banks. It was on the same year that the Doha Stock Exchange began
operations in 1997. The two monetary authorities that preceded the establishment
of the Central Bank of Oman, namely the Muscat Currency Authority in 1970 and
the Oman Currency Board in 1972, were not vested with full banking status, but,
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they had well prepared the ground for the emergence of the Central Bank of Oman.
However the major event heralding the eminent creation of the Central Bank of Oman
was the launching of the Banking Law in 1974 (which was amended vide Royal De-
cree No. 114/2000). Nonetheless, CBI is limited, with virtually nonexistent political
autonomy. Since 1989 Jordan has made considerable stabilisation and adjustment ef-
forts. The amendments to the CB Act brought in 1992 set the objectives of the CB
and the powers to full them. Despite that, both political and economic autonomy is
limited. Governmental involvement in the appointment and dismissal of the Board, as
well as unclear conditions regarding CB's credit to the government contribute to this
direction.
Bank of Israel was established by Law 5714-1954 and became eective in December
1954. The sole major amendment to the status of the CB came in 1985 with the
passing of the \No Printing Law", which prohibited the Bank from granting loans to
the government. In the late 1990s discussions started regarding the modernisation of
the CB Act, which resulted in the Levin Committee recommendations. However, as of
January 2008 a new Bank of Israel Law has not yet passed. Nonetheless, Israel started
implicit ination targeting in 1992 which was further strengthened in 1997 with the
exchange rate band gradually widening. The GMT-index of Arnone, Laurens, and
Segalotto (2006) suggests that the level of CBI is low, especially in terms of political
autonomy.
In 1983-84 both Tunisia and Morocco embarked in Structural Adjustment Policies
aimed at boosting the development of the private sector and removing the distortions
due to a very large public sector. Central Bank of Tunisia was created by Act No.
58-90 in 1958, when Tunisia withdrew from the Franc-zone. In 1994 the banking leg-
islation was modied reinforcing CB's powers in banking regulation and supervision.
A further amendment took place in 2000 which mainly expanded and modernised the
CB activities. Both Gisolo (2007) and Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto (2006), though
using dierent indexes, nd that Tunisia enjoys the higher level of CBI in the MENA
region. Preparing the grounds for a potential ination targeting shift, Tunisia amended
the organic law of the CB in May 2006, assigning price stability as the primary ob-
jective, enhancing transparency and strengthening CB's independence. However, this
reform is too recent to assess its impact. Bank Al-Maghrib was established in 1959 and
a new currency was adopted at the same time. In July 1993 a new banking act was
adopted establishing a unied regulatory framework for all credit institutions. This
act extended the sphere of consultation between monetary authorities and credit insti-
tutions and reinforced the power of the central bank in regulating and supervising the
activities of credit institutions. Soon afterwards (October 1993), amendments were
brought to the Bank's statutes aiming at specifying more accurately its attributions,
in particular, those related to monetary policy, and granting more autonomy to its
administration and management bodies. 1993 is the date we chose as the CB reform
date for Morocco. Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto's (2006) GMT-index shows that
although economic autonomy is high, Bank Al-Maghrib is politically dominated. Cre-
ating the preparatory work for a move towards an ination targeting regime, a new
amendment bill was under way in 2006, which according to Gisolo (2007) it has not yet
been enacted. The new statutes of the CB (2006) state the primacy of price stability
and the independence of the CB. CB becomes responsible for devising and conducting
monetary policy and government inuence is diminished by having only one seat of
government representation in the Board without voting right.
Despite structural reforms, MENA region's focus on improving the level of CBI
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Table A.8: GMT-index recent CB Reforms - MENA (own calculations)
Political Autonomy (PA)
Country CBR PA(1) PA(2) PA(3) PA(4) PA(5) PA(6) PA(7) PA(8) PA
EGY 1998 1 1
ISR 1997 1 1
JOR 1992 1 1 1 3
MAR 1993 1 1 2
OMN 2000 1 1
QAT 1997 1 1 2
TUN 2000 1 1 1 1 1 5
Economic Autonomy (EA)
Country CBR EA(1) EA(2) EA(3) EA(4) EA(5) EA(6) EA(7a) EA(7b) EA
EGY 1998 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
ISR 1997 1 1 1 1 1 5
JOR 1992 1 1 2
MAR 1993 1 1 1 1 1 5
OMN 2000 1 1 1 1 4
QAT1 1997 1 1
TUN 2000 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia were assessed by Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto (2006).
GMT-indexes for Jordan, Oman and Qatar refer to the CB Acts as depicted in Table B.1.
has been neglected. Partially due to xed exchange rates (that leave no much space
for independent monetary policy), partially due to lack of interest CB's legal frame-
work was mainly transformed towards modernising monetary policy instruments and
practices, rather than isolating these practices from governmental inuences.
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B Appendix Central Bank Reforms
Table B.1: Central Bank Reforms: Dates and Acts
Name Year Central Bank Act
Albania 1996 Law No.8076 of February 1996 \On the Bank of Albania" (Mal-
iszewski 2000)
Australia 1993 IT - April 1993 (Carare & Stone 2003, Roger & Stone 2005)
Austria a 1998 Federal Act as amended by No. 60/1998, April 1998 - ESCB
Barbados 1992 Chapter 323C. Central bank of Barbados 1992 (Lybek & Morris
2004)
Belgium 1 1993 Organic Law of the National Bank of Belgium of March 1993
(EMI 1993, 1995)
Belgium 2a 1998 Organic Act DD. February 1998 of the National Bank of Belgium
- ESBC (EMI, 1998)
Bolivia 1995 Law on the Central Bank of Bolivia, Law 1670 of October 1995
(Lybek & Morris 2004, Jacome & Vazquez 2005)
Brazil 1999 IT-June 1999 (Carare & Stone 2003, Roger & Stone 2005)
Burundi 1993 Status de la Banque de la Republic du Burundi, July 1993 (in
French)
Canada 1b 1991 IT - February 1991 (Carare & Stone 2003, Roger & Stone 2005)
Canada 2 2001 Bank of Canada Act, R.S., 1985 with amendments in October
2001 (Lybek & Morris 2004)
Chile 1 1989 Law 18,840, Basic Constitutional Act of the Central Bank of
Chile, October 1989 (Jacome & Vazquez 2005)
Chile 2i 1999 IT-September 1999 (Carare & Stone 2003, Roger & Stone 2005).
Law 18,840 as amended by Law 19,653 of December 1999 (ref-
erence)
China, P.R. 1995 Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of
China, promulgated by Order No. 46 of the President of the
People's Republic of China in March 1995
Colombia 1i 1992 Law No. 31 of December 1992 on the Bank of the Republic of
Colombia (Lybek & Morris 2004, Jacome & Vazquez 2005)
Colombia 2 2000 IT-2000 (Carare & Stone 2003), IT - Sept 1999 (Roger & Stone
2005)
Costa Rica 1995 Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, No. 7558 of
November 1995 (Jacome & Vazquez 2005)
Cyprus 2002 The Central Bank of Cyprus Act of 2002 (in force from July
2002)
Czech Republic 1h 1993 National Council Act No. 6/1993 Coll., of December 1992 on the
Czech National Bank (in eect from January 1993) (Maliszewski
2000)
Czech Republic 2 1998 IT-January 1998 (Roger & Stone 2005). Act No. 6/1993, as
amended by Act No. 15/1998 Coll., of 1998
Denmark 1998 Act No. 116 of 7th April 1936 as amended (Arnone, Laurens &
Segalotto 2006)
Ecuador 1 1992 Ley de Regimen Monetario y Banco del Estado, May 1992 (Ja-
come & Vazquez 2005)
Ecuador 2 1998 Amendment Law of 1998 (Jacome & Vazquez 2005)
Egypt 1998 Statutes of the Central Bank of Egypt of 1975, last amended in
1998 (Arnone, Laurens & Segalotto 2006)
El Salvador 1 1991 Ley Organica del Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador, De-
creto No. 746, April 1991 (Jacome & Vazquez 2005)
El Salvador 2 1996 Charter of the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador, Reforms of
May 1996 (Lybek & Morris 2004)
Ethiopia 1994 Mehran et al 1998
Finlanda 1998 Act on the Bank of Finland, No. 214/1998 of March 1998 -
ESCB (Lybek & Morris 2004)
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Table B.1 { Continued
Name Year Central Bank Act
France 1h 1994 Statute of the Banque de France, amended by Act 93-980 of
August 1993 and Act 93-1444 of December 1993 (in eect from
January 1994) (EMI 1995)
France 2a 1998 Statute of the Banque de France - A ct 98-357 of May 1998 -
ESCB (in eect from 1 Jan 1999)
Georgia 1996 Organic Law of Georgia on the National Bank 1995 as amended
in May 1996 (Maliszewski 2000)
Germany 1 1994 Bundesbank Act as amended in 1992
Germany 2a 1997 Sixth Act Amending the Bundesbank Act in December 1997
(apart from some provisions of Art.1, all other parts shall enter
into force on the date from which Germany participates in the
Monetary Union pursuant to Art. 109j of EU)
Ghana 2 2002 Bank of Ghana Act, January 2002 Act 612
Greece 1 1994 Statute of the Bank of Greece, amended by the General Meeting
of Shareholders November 1994, ratied by law 2275/1994
Greece 2 h 1998 Statute of the Bank of Greece, amended by the General Meeting
of Shareholders December 1997, ratied by law 2609/1998
Hondurasi 1996 Ley del Banco Central del Honduras Decreto No. 53 de Feb
1950, reformada por lo decreto No. 228-96 de Deciembro de
1996 (in Spanish)
Hungary 1 1991 Act LX of October 1991 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Mal-
iszewski 2000, CMN 2002)
Hungary 2h 1997 Act CXXIX of 1996 on the Amendment of Act LX of 1991 on
the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (in eect from 1997) (Maliszewski
2000)
Iceland 2001 IT-March 2001 (Roger & Stone 2005). Act No. 36/2001 on the
Central Bank of Iceland, May 2001 (Lybek & Morris 2004)
Indonesia 1999 Act of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 23 of May 1999 concerning
Bank Indonesia
Ireland 1 1989 Central Bank Act 1989, No. 16 of July 1989
Ireland 2a 1998 Central Bank of Ireland Act 1998, No. 2 of March 1998 (eective
from May 1998, apart from sections 13,14,15,16)
Israelc 1997 IT - June 1997 (Carare & Stone 2003, Roger & Stone 2005)
Italy 1 1993 Statute of the Bank of Italy of 1936, as amended by Presidential
Decrees of 6 March and 18 July 1992 by Law No. 82 of February
1992, Law No. 483 of November 1993 and Decree No. 385 of
September 1993 (EMI, 1993, 1995, 1996)
Italy 2a 1998 Statute of the Bank of Italy of 1936, as amended by Presidential
Decree on Apr 1998 (Lybek & Morris 2004)
Japanh 1998 The Bank of Japan Law of June 1997 (in eect from April 1998)
Jordan 1992 Central Bank Of Jordan Law No.23 of 1971 as amended by Laws
No. 10 and 16 of March and April 1992 (Lybek & Morris 2004)
Kenyah 1997 The Central Bank of Kenya Act CAP 491 as amended by No. 9
of 1996 (in eect from April 1997) (Mehran et al 1998)
Koreadh 1998 The Bank of Korea Act of 1950, wholly amended by Law No.
5491 of December 1997 (eective from April 1998) (Lybek &
Morris 2004)
Kyrgyz Republic 1997 Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on the National Bank of the Kyrgyz
Republic No. 59, July 1997 (Maliszewski 2000, Lybek & Moris
2004)
Latvia 1e 1994 Law \On the Bank of Latvia" of May 1992 (Malszewski 2000,
CMN 2002)
Latvia 2 1998 Law \On the Bank of Latvia" of 1992, with amendments passed
by the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia in November 1998 (Ly-
bek 1999)
Lesotho 2000 Central Bank of Lesotho Act, August 2000
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Name Year Central Bank Act
Luxembourga 1998 Organic Law of the Banque Central du Luxembourg, Law of
December 1998 - ESCB (in eect from January 1999)
Malaysia 1994 Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 - revised March 1994 (Lybek
& Morris 2004)
Malta 1 1994 CAP 204 as amended by Acts XIV and XXVI of 1994 (in eect
from November 1994)
Malta 2 2002 CAP 204 as amended by Act XVII of 2002 (in eect from
September 2002)
Mexico 1h 1994 Banco de Mexico Law of December 1993 (in eect from April
1994)
Mexico 2 1999 Banco de Mexico Law as amended in January 1999 (ALS 2006)
Moldova 1995 Law No. 548-XIII on the National Bank of Moldova of July 1995
(CMN 2002, Maliszewski 2000, Lybek & Morris 2004)
Morocco 1993 Statutes of Bank Al-maghrib - Morocco of 1959, amended as of
October 1993 (Lybek & Morris 2004)
Namibiai 1997 Bank of Namibia Act No 15 of December 1997
Netherlands 1i 1993 Netherlandsche Bank Act of December 1993 (EMI 1993, 1995)
Netherlands 2a 1998 Bank Act of 1998 of April 1998, Stb. 200 - ESBC
New Zealandh 1990 The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act of 1989 (into force in
February 1990) (St. Dawe Reserve Bank Bulletin Vol. 53, No.
1, 1990)
Nicaragua 1 1992 Decreto No. 42-92 Ley Orgnica del Banco Central de Nicaragua
of July 1992
Nicaragua 2 1999 Organic Law of the Central Bank of Nicaragua, Law No. 317 of
September 1999
Nigeria 1999 Central Bank of Nigeria Decree No 24 of 1991 as amended by
Decree No 41 of 1999
Norwayh 2000 Norges Bank Act amended by Act No. 95 of December 1999 (in
force April 2000)
Omani 2000 Banking Law of 1974 as amended by Royal Decree No. 114/2000
of December 2000 (Lybek & Morris 2004)
Paraguay 1995 Law No. 489 Organic Law of the Central Bank of Paraguay,
August 1995 (Jacome & Vazquez 2005)
Peru 1 1993 Central Reserve Bank of Peru Organic Law, Decree-Law No.
26123, January 1993 (Lybek & Morris 2004, Jacome & Vazquez
2005)
Peru 2 2002 IT - January 2002 (Carare & Stone 2003, Roger & Stone 2005)
Philippines 1 1993 Republic Act No. 7653, The New Central Bank Act of the Re-
public of Philippines of 1992, passed by the House of Represen-
tatives and the Senate in June 1993 (Lybek & Morris 2004)
Philippines 2 2002 IT - January 2002 (Carare & Stone 2003, Roger & Stone 2005)
Poland 1 1992 The Act on the National Bank of Poland of 1992, 72/1999, item
360 (Maliszweski 2000)
Poland 2h 1998 The Act on the National Bank of Poland of August 1997, No.
140, item 938 (in eect from Jan 1998)(Maliszewsk 2000, CMN
2002). IT - October 1998 (Roger & Stone 2005)
Portugal 1 1995 Bank de Portugal Organic Law, as amended by Law 231/95 of
September 1995 (EMI, 1993, 1995)
Portugal 2a 1998 Organic Law No. 5/98 of January 1998 - ESCB
Qatar 1997 Decree Law No. 15 of August 1993
Russia 1995 Federal Law No. 65-FZ, of April 1995, \On Amending the RS-
FSR Law On the Central Bank of the RSFSR (Bank of Russia)"
(CMN 2002, Maliszewski 2000)
Rwanda 1997 Law No 11/97 of July 1997 regarding Statutes of the National
Bank of Rwanda
Sierra Leone 2000 The Bank of Sierra Leone Act, February 2000
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Name Year Central Bank Act
Singapore 1998 Act 28 of July 1998 Monetary Authority of Singapore (Amend-
ment) Act of July 1998
Slovak Republic 1h 1993 Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 566/1992
Coll. of November 1992 on the National Bank of Slovakia (in
eect from January 1993) (CMN 2002, Maliszewski 2000)
Slovak Republic 2 2001 Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 149/2001
of May 2001
Slovenia 1f 1993 Law on the National Bank of Slovenia, June 1991
Slovenia 2 2002 Bank of Slovenia Act, Ocial Gazettee of the Republic of Slove-
nia No. 58/02, July 2002
South Africa 1 1996 South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989 as amended by Act
2 of March 1996 (Mehran et al 1998)
South Africa 2 2000 IT - February 2000 (Roger & Stone 2005) South African Reserve
Bank Act 90 of 1989 as amended by Act 57 of November 2000
Spain 1 1994 Law of Autonomy of the Banco de Espana, Law 13/1994, June
1994 (EMI, 1995)
Spain 2a 1998 Law of Autonomy of the Banco de Espana, as amended by Law
12/1998, April 1998 - ESCB (Lybek & Morris 2004)
Sweden 1g 1995 IT - (Jan 1993 Carare & Stone 2003, Roger & Stone 2005), IT
-1995 (JP Morgan Guide to Central Banking Watching, 2000)
Sweden 2 1999 The Sveriges Riksbank Act, January 1999
Switzerland 2000 National Bank Law of 1953, as of May 2000 (Lybek & Morris
2004, ALS 2006)
Thailand 2000 IT-May 2000 (Carare & Stone 2003, Roger & Stone 2005)
Trinidad & Tobago 1994 Central Bank Act- Chapter 79:02, amended by Act No. 23 of
1994 (Lybek & Morris 2004)
Tunisia 2000 Law 58-90 of 1958, amended as of April 2000 (Lybek & Morris
2004)
Turkey 2001 The Law on the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey No
1211 amended as of Law No. 4651 of April 2001
Uganda 1993 The Bank of Uganda Statute, May 1993, Statute No 5 (Mehran
et al 1998)
United Kingdom 1 1992 IT- October 1992 (Carare & Stone 2003, Roger & Stone 2005)
United Kingdom 2 1998 Bank of England Act, June 1998 (ALS 2006)
Uruguay 1995 Banco Central del Uruguay Charter, Law No. 1666 of March
1995 (Jacome & Vazquez 2005)
Venezuela, R. B. 1i 1992 Law of the Central Bank of Venezuela of December 1992 (Jacome
& Vazquez 2005)
Venezuela, R. B. 2 2001 Law on the Central Bank of Venezuela, amended as of September
2001 (Lybek & Morris 2004)
Sources: Unless otherwise specied, details of dates and reforms were collected from
central bank websites, annual reports and various working papers. EMI refers to the Reports
of the European Monetary Institute. Ination Targeting (IT) Dates are taken from Carare
& Stone (2003), Roger & Stone (2005), and JP Morgan Guide to Central Bank Watching
(2000). IT does not always correspond to a new CB Act, rather it could either be signaled
by a CB Directive/Regulation or by an internal decision of the CB Board.
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Notes
aThese are the countries that joined the EMU in January 1999. The nal amendments to the Acts
of the member states in order to accord with the European Treaty requirements took place during
1998, but the enactment date for most cases was January 1999. Hence, the CB reform date is set to
1999.
bIn 1991, Bank of Canada, jointly with the government adopted ination targeting, without a
modication in the Bank's Act. Despite the fact that in practice price stability is being given priority,
according to the preamble of the Act it is one among other objectives until today.
cSince 1992 Israel has set an ination target, together with other intermediate targets. However,
we pick the date (1997) where a pure ination target was adopted. Since the establishment, the Bank
of Israel Law, 5714-1954 has only been amended in 1985.
dKorea started ination targeting from January 2001, according to Roger & Stone (2005).
eLatvia's rst Law after the collapse of USSR was passed in 1992. However, the removal of the
ruble and the introduction of the lets took place in 1993. Our debt data start from 1994, which is
the date we choose here. Furthermore, the Law amendment of (June) 1997 was further amended on
October 1998 to prevent Minister of Finance from temporarily postponing decisions by the Board and
explicitly preventing direct credit to the government.
fDebt data on Slovenia start from 1993.
gWe chosen 1995 as the ination targeting date, avoiding this way the adverse eects of the ERM
crisis on Sweden's economy.
hThese are the countries in which the approval (or promulgation) date diers from the enforcement
one. We always use the latter one for the Central Bank Reform date.
iFor these countries the enactment and/or enforcement date refers to an end of year date (Decem-
ber). In order to allow for the amended law to inuence the monetary and/or scal policy practice,
we set the Central Bank Reform date to the next year.
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C Control Variables
Table C.1: Countries in each control dummy
HIPC HIGH DB
Ghana (2002) Belgium (1993)
Rwanda (1997) Belgium (1999)
Honduras (1997 ) Ireland (1989)
Nicaragua (1999) Israel (1997)
Bolivia (1995) Jordan (1992)
Sierra Leone (2000) Italy (1993)
Source: IMF and WB (2005) Italy (1999)
Greece (1994)
CRISIS Greece (1998)
Ghana (2002)
UNITED KINGDOM (1992) Egypt (1998)
GERMANY (1994) Poland (1992)
FRANCE (1994) Morocco (1993)
SPAIN (1994) Rwanda (1997)
ITALY (1993) Honduras (1997)
KOREA (1998) Nicaragua (1992)
COLOMBIA (2000) Nicaragua (1999)
THAILAND (2000) Uganda (1993)
MEXICO (1994) Sierra Leone (2000)
TURKEY (2001) Burundi (1993)
CHINA,P.R. (1995) Ethiopia (1994)
MOLDOVA (1995) Comment: DB > 80%
ECUADOR (1998)
ALBANIA (1996)
RUSSIA (1995)
KYRGYZ R. (1997)
INDONESIA (1999)
PARAGUAY (1995)
Source: Jacome and Vazquez (2005), Kaminsky and Reinhart
(2001), Mouratidis and Spagnolo (2004), Reinhart and Rogo
(2008)
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Table C.2: Classication of countries-reforms according their GMT-index
ihigh iumed ilmed ilow
COUNTRY - YEAR COUNTRY - YEAR COUNTRY - YEAR COUNTRY - YEAR
Finland 1999 Iceland 2001 Australia 1993 New Zealand 1990
Sweden 1999 Denmark 1998 UK 1992 Singapore 1998
Switzerland 2000 Netherlands 1994 Canada 2001 Sweden 1995
Austria 1999 UK 1998 Malta 1994 Norway 2000
Netherlands 1999 Canada 1991 Uruguay 1995 Belgium 1993
Luxembourg 1999 France 1994 Cyprus 2002 Ireland 1989
Germany 1994 Spain 1994 Hungary 1991 Japan 1998
Germany 1999 Malta 2002 Hungary 1997 Barbados 1992
France 1999 Slovenia 1993 Greece 1994 Portugal 1995
Belgium 1999 Slovenia 2002 Slovak R. 1993 Israel 1997
Ireland 1999 Italy 1993 Slovak R. 2001 Oman 2001
Chile 1989 Tunisia 2000 Colombia 1993 Qatar 1997
Chile 2000 Czech R. 1993 Colombia 2000 Jordan 1992
Spain 1999 Costa Rica 1995 Trinidad & Tob. 1994 Malaysia 1994
Portugal 1999 El Salvador 1991 Brazil 1999 S. Korea 1998
Italy 1999 Latvia 1994 Poland 1992 S. Africa 1996
Czech R. 1998 Mexico 1999 China,P.R. 1995 S. Africa 2000
Greece 1998 Turkey 2001 Morocco 1993 Namibia 1998
El Salvador 1996 Poland 1998 Rwanda 1997 Thailand 2000
Latvia 1998 Moldova 1995 Honduras 1997 Ghana 2002
Mexico 1994 Ecuador 1992 Nicaragua 1992 Egypt 1998
Peru 1993 Ecuador 1998 Nicaragua 1999 Lesotho 2000
Peru 2002 Georgia 1996 Philippines 1993 Uganda 1993
Bolivia 1995 Venezuela, R. B. 1993 Philippines 2002 Burundi 1993
Kyrgyz R. 1997 Venezuela, R. B. 2001 Albania 1996 Ethiopia 1994
Paraguay 1995 Russia 1995 Nigeria 1999
Sierra Leone 2000
Indonesia 1999
Kenya 1997
D Additional Estimation Results
With the exclusion of the CRISIS and HIPC countries we have 82 observations re-
maining. Table D.1 displays the results for equation (3) when the CRISIS and HIPC
countries are excluded. In columns (1)-(3), where quality is treated as a separate
variable, the eect of quality on debt accumulation is still signicant, but of smaller
size. Ination and exchange rate regimes fail to explain the debt process of dierent
countries. When quality of institutions is interacted with the independence level of
each central bank, we see from column (4) that only for the countries that gave a high
degree of CBI the eect of quality is signicantly negative. Controlling for Nicaragua
(NIC1-1992), Australia (AUS-1993) and Malta (MLT1-1994) turns the IUMED and
ILOW groups signicant, although the ILMED is still unimportant.
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Table D.1: Estimation Results for Equation (3) excluding CRISIS and HIPC countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CONST 21.471 20.898 23.376 20.137 23.257
(2.798)*** (3.186)*** (2.872)*** (2.838)*** (6.773)***
QUAL -2.432 -2.366 -2.298
(-2.280)** (-2.441)** (-2.094)**
GGDP -0.230 -0.233 -0.247 -0.400 -0.386
(-1.924)* (-2.026)** (-1.845)* (-3.629)*** (0.116)***
INF -0.009 -0.010 0.000 0.000
(-0.216) (-0.199) (0.000)*** (0.000)***
HIGHDB -11.833 -11.743 -12.541 -14.739 -14.548
(-2.223)** (-2.299)** (-2.266)** (-3.098)*** (4.933)***
QUAL*IHIGH -3.275 -3.713
(-3.240)*** (0.970)***
QUAL*IUMED -1.749 -2.272
(-1.385) (1.216)*
QUAL*ILMED 0.397 -1.743
(0.208) (1.750)
QUAL*ILOW -1.323 -1.831
(-1.320) (0.958)*
NIC1 47.937 49.014
(5.675)*** (9.308)***
AUS 45.242
(11.849)***
MLT1 40.045
(8.491)***
EXINTER -1.331
(-0.184)
EXFLOAT -3.941
(-0.647)
R-square 0.119 0.119 0.125 0.269 0.336
Adj. R-square 0.074 0.085 0.055 0.199 0.253
SER 20.752 20.621 20.960 19.293 18.641
No of Observ. 82 82 82 82 82
F-stat 2.611 3.518 1.786 3.880 4.041
Prob(F-stat) 0.042 0.019 0.113 0.001 0.000
Note: t-ratios in parenthesis
* = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1% levels of signicance
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Table D.2: Estimation Results for Equation (3) with dierent samples
Exclude residuals with jSEj > 2 Exclude residuals with jSEj > 1:5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Const. 28.801 27.955 26.074 30.934 30.726
(4.506)*** (4.284)*** (3.918)*** (5.748)*** (5.662)***
QUAL -3.470 -3.739
(-4.036)*** (-5.103)***
GGDP -0.341 -0.393 -0.405 -0.291 -0.328
(-3.872)*** (-4.317)*** (-4.529)*** (-3.828)*** (-4.087)***
INF -0.066 -0.060 -0.070 -0.063 -0.060
(-1.916)* (-1.772)* (-1.705)* (-2.130)** (-1.997)**
HIGHDB -14.204 -15.623 -15.765 -13.773 -15.643
(-3.431)*** (-3.669)*** (-3.704)*** (-3.677)*** (-4.135)***
CRISIS 30.480 29.388 30.077 31.275 30.651
(7.009)*** (6.824)*** (7.027)*** (8.312)*** (8.397)***
HIPC -8.711 -7.203 -7.230 -12.158 -10.608
(-1.831)* (-1.665)* (-1.375) (-2.757)*** (-2.475)**
QUAL*IHIGH -4.384 -4.177 -4.449
(-4.892)*** (-4.739)*** (-5.804)***
QUAL*IUMED -2.928 -2.865 -3.604
(-2.843)*** (-2.824)*** (-4.091)***
QUAL*ILMED -2.569 -2.475 -3.283
(-2.086)** (-2.037)** (-3.100)***
QUAL*ILOW -2.267 -2.130 -2.600
(-2.525)** (-2.386)** (-3.666)***
EXFIXED 2.198
(0.541)
EXINTER 4.127
(0.768)
R-square 0.525 0.566 0.570 0.619 0.651
Adj. R-square 0.494 0.522 0.515 0.591 0.612
SER 17.234 16.740 16.862 14.391 14.017
No of Observ. 99 99 99 90 90
F-stat 16.918 12.900 10.469 22.427 16.593
Prob(F-stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: t-ratios in parenthesis
* = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1% levels of signicance
In the rst three columns of Table D.2 we exclude observations for which residuals
are higher/lower than 2 standard deviations from the line, and the sample size is
reduced to 99 reforms. All explanatory variables remain signicant, apart from the
exchange rate regimes. The impact of corruption (QUAL) is of the same magnitude
both on its own and when interacted with the level of independence the respective
reform gave. Columns (4) and (5) include observations within 1.5 standard deviations
from the regression line and the results remain robust.
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